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Abstract
We improve the fundamental security threshold of eventual consensus Proof-of-Stake (PoS) blockchain protocols
under longest-chain rule, reflecting for the first time the positive effect of rounds with concurrent honest leaders.
Current analyses of these protocols reduce consistency to the dynamics of an abstract, round-based block creation
process that is determined by three probabilities:
• pA, the probability that a round has at least one adversarial leader;
• ph, the probability that a round has a single honest leader; and
• pH, the probability that a round has multiple, but honest, leaders.
We present a consistency analysis that achieves the optimal threshold ph+pH > pA. is is a first in the literature and
can be applied to both the simple synchronous seing and the seing with bounded delays. Moreover, we achieve
the optimal consistency error e−Θ(k) where k is the confirmation time. We also provide an efficient algorithm to
explicitly calculate these error probabilities in the synchronous seing.
All existing consistency analyses either incur a penalty for rounds with concurrent honest leaders, or treat them
neutrally. Specifically, the consistency analyses inOuroboros Praos (Eurocrypt 2018) andGenesis (CCS 2018) assume
that the probability of a uniquely honest round exceeds that of the other two events combined (i.e., ph−pH > pA); the
analyses in Sleepy Consensus (Asiacrypt 2017) and Snow White (Fin. Crypto 2019) assume that a uniquely honest
round is more likely than an adversarial round (i.e., ph > pA). In addition, previous analyses completely break down
when uniquely honest rounds become less frequent, i.e., ph < pA. ese thresholds determine the critical trade-off
between the honest majority, network delays, and consistency error.
Our new results can be directly applied to improve the consistency guarantees of the existing protocols. We
complement these results with a consistency analysis in the seing where uniquely honest slots are rare, even
leing ph = 0, under the added assumption that honest players adopt a consistent chain selection rule.
1 Introduction
Proof-of-Stake (PoS) blockchain protocols have emerged as a viable alternative to resource-intensive Proof-of-Work
(PoW) blockchain protocols such as Bitcoin and Ethereum. ese PoS protocols are organized in rounds (which we
call slots in this paper); their most critical algorithmic component is a leader election procedure which determines—
for each slot—a subset of participants with the authority to add a block to the blockchain. Existing security analyses
of these protocols are logically divided into two components: the first reasons about the properties of the leader
election process, the second reasons about the combinatorial properties of the blockchains that can be produced
by an idealized leader schedule in the face of adaptive adversarial control of some participants. An aractive side
effect of this structure is that the combinatorial considerations can be treated independently of other aspects of the
protocol. A recent article of Blum et al. [3] gave an axiomatic treatment of this combinatorial portion of the analysis
which we extend in this paper.
ese common combinatorial arguments can be formulated with very lile information about the leader election
process. Specifically, current analyses focus on three parameters:
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• ph, the probability that a slot is uniquely honest, having a single honest leader;
• pH, the probability that a slot is multiply honest, having multiple, but honest, leaders; and
• pA, the probability that a slot has at least one adversarial leader.
Our major contribution is a generic, rigorous guarantee of consistency under the most desirable assumption1 ph +
pH > pA that achieves optimal consistency error exp(−Θ(k)) as a function of confirmation time k. Our analysis can
be directly applied to existing protocols to improve their consistency guarantees.
To contrast this with existing literature, the analysis of Ouroboros Praos [5] and Ouroboros Genesis [1] require
the threshold assumption ph−pH > pA to achieve the optimal consistency error of e−Θ(k). Note howmultiply honest
slots actually detract from security, appearing negatively in the basic security threshold. e consistency analyses
in Snow White [2] and Sleepy Consensus [10] assume an improved threshold ph > pA; however, they only establish
a consistency error bound of e−Θ(
√
k). Note here that multiply honest slots appear neutrally. All existing analyses
break down if ph < pA, i.e., when the uniquely honest slots are less probable than the adversarial slots.
Multiply honest slots may arise by design, e.g., when each player checks privately whether he is a leader. ey
may also occur naturally in the non-synchronous seing when the time between the broadcast of two blocks is
exceeded by network delay—in this case the party issuing the later block may not be aware of the earlier block
which can result the two blocks sharing the same chain history, a de facto incidence of multiple honest leaders. e
role of these slots is rather delicate: while it is good for the system to have many honest blocks, concurrent blocks
can help the adversary in creating two long, diverging blockchains that might jeopardize the consistency property.
Our new analysis shows that this second effect can be mitigated, achieving consistency error bound of e−Θ(k) under
the (tight) assumption ph + pH > pA.
Our results and contributions. As described above, we show for the first time that PoS blockchain protocols
using the longest-chain rule can achieve a consistency error of e−Θ(k) under the desirable condition ph + pH > pA.
is improves the security guarantee of all “longest chain rule” PoS protocols such as Praos [5], Genesis [1], and
Snow White [2] (we remark that other PoS protocols such as Algorand [9] operate in a different seing where
explicit participation bounds are assumed and forks can be prevented). We discuss our results in more detail before
turning to the model and proofs.
Our analysis in the simple synchronous model achieves the same asymptotic error bound as in [4]—the tightest
result in the literature—under a much weaker assumption, namely ph + pH > pA. us PoS protocols can in fact
achieve consistency with ph < pA, a regime beyond reach of all previous analyses. When uniquely honest slots
are rare (i.e., when ph is very small), our bound has the desired dependence on ph. Moreover, when pH = 0 (i.e.,
all honest slots are in fact uniquely honest), we exactly recover the bound in [4]. We also give an algorithm to
explicitly compute the probability that a given slot encounters a consistency violation under the idealized leader
election mechanism. e time and space required by this algorithm is cubic in the length of the protocol execution.
Next, we consider a variant model where the honest players use a consistent tie-breaking rule when selecting
the longest chain. (I.e., when a fixed set of blockchains of equal length are presented to a collection of honest players,
they all select the same chain. In previous models, the adversary had the right to break such ties by influencing
network delivery.) Assuming ph + pH > pA, we prove that the consistency error bound in this model is identical to
the e−Θ(k) bound in [4] even when ph = 0. No existing analysis survives in this regime.
∆-synchronous setting. In the ∆-synchronous communication seing, all messages are delivered with at most
a ∆ delay. Our results mentioned above can be transferred to this seing using the ∆-synchronous to synchronous
reduction approach used in the Ouroboros Praos analysis [5]. us, we can achieve a consistency error probability
of e−Θ(k) in this seing as well. is analysis is presented in Section 8.
A technical overview. We initially work in the synchronous communication model and extend the synchronous
combinatorial framework of [3] to accommodate multiply honest slots.
1 Consistency is unachievable in the case ph + pH < pA. See [7] for a detailed discussion of the honest majority assumption.
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First, our analysis focuses on a combinatorial event called a “Catalan slot.”2 Catalan slots are honest slots c
with the property that any interval containing c possesses strictly more honest slots—with any number of honest
leaders—than adversarial ones. e analysis of [2] and [10] introduced this basic concept, though they counted only
uniquely honest slots. In comparison with their analysis, then, our treatment has two important advantages: first of
all, we let multiply honest slots count in the analysis and, additionally, we achieve strikingly stronger error bounds:
specifically, we achieve optimal selement error of exp(−θ(k)) rather than exp(−θ(
√
k)).
A Catalan slot c acts as a barrier for the adversary in that if an honest blockchain from a slot h < c is padded with
adversarial blocks and presented to an honest observer at slot c + 1, the observer will never adopt this blockchain.
As a result, the chains adopted by this honest observer must contain some block from slot c. Note that this is true
even if c is multiply honest. A critical observation is that a slot is Catalan if and only if all competitive blockchains in
future slots contain at least one block from this slot. us, if a Catalan slot c is uniquely honest, all blockchains that
are eligible to be adopted by future honest players must contain the (only) honest block issued from slot c. We call
this the “Unique Vertex Property” (UVP). Note how the UVP is reminiscent of the “Common Prefix Property” (CP)
in the literature. us, together, the UVP and Catalan slots act as a conduit between consistency violations and the
underlying stochastic process.
Our major technical challenge is to bound the probability that Catalan slots are infrequent. Here we break away
entirely from the analysis of [2] and approach the question using the theory of generating functions and stochastic
dominance. We find an exact generating function for a related event and use this, by dominance, to control the
undesirable event that a long window of slots is devoid of Catalan slots. is yields asymptotically optimal selement
bounds.
Finally, it follows from the discussion above that if two consecutive slots are Catalan then any subsequent honest
blockmust contain, in its prefix, a block from each of these slots. In a seing where all honest players use a consistent
longest-chain selection rule, we show that both slots have UVP as well. Since Catalan slots can be multiply honest,
PoS protocols can achieve a consistency error bound of e−Θ(k) in this model even if ph = 0.
In a separate line of reasoning, in Section 6, we generalize the fork-theoretic framework of Blum et al. [3] for
the multi-leader seing. Here, we characterize the UVP in terms of the so-called “relative margin,” a combinatorial
property of a given slot. We describe an adversary who optimally aacks the UVP of all slots, simultaneously. Next,
we prove a recurrence relation for relative margin. Suppose each slot is independently and identically chosen (by
the leader election mechanism) to be either uniquely honest, multiply honest, or adversarial. e recurrence relation
mentioned above then leads to an algorithm to explicitly compute the probability that a given slot encounters a
consistency violation; see Section 6.6. In contrast, the Catalan slot-centric characterization of the UVP gives us only
an asymptotic bound on this probability. It can be concluded that the fork-framework, aer all, is expressive enough
to capture consistency violations in the multi-leader seing.
Outline. We specify our model in Section 2 and focus on a specific consistency property called “k-selement.” is
section also contains ourmain theorems; the proofs are deferred to Section 4. In Section 3, we describe amplifications
to the fork framework of [3] in order to explore the relationship between Catalan slots and the UVP. In Section 4, we
present two bounds on the stochastic events of interest, e.g., the rarity of a Catalan slot; these bounds lead to short
proofs of the main theorems. e proofs of these bounds are presented next in Section 5 which contains all of our
probabilistic arguments.
Section 6 contains an alternative treatment of the UVP via fork-theoretic notions of [3]. Along the way, it de-
scribes an optimal adversary who simultaneously aacks the consistency of all slots. It also describes an algorithm
to compute explicit values for the probability of consistency violations. e proofs of two important theorems from
this section are presented subsequently in Section 7.
Our treatment of the ∆-synchronous seing is presented in Section 8. In Section 9, we treat the traditional
Common Prefix (CP) violations using our bounds on the UVP.
InAppendix A, we characterize common prefix violations in the presence of multiply honest slots using “balanced
forks” from [3] (and, importantly, without using Catalan slots).
2e name is a nod to the Catalan number in combinatorics: e nth Catalan numberCn is the number of stringsw ∈ {0, 1}2n so that every
prefix x of w satisfies#0(x) ≥ #1(x).
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2 e model and our main theorems
We study the behavior of the elementary longest-chain rule algorithm, carried out by a collection of participants:
• In each round, each participant collects all valid blockchains from the network; if a participant is a leader in
the round, he adds a block to the longest chain and broadcasts the result.
Here, “valid” indicates that any block appearing in the chain was indeed issued by a leader from the associated slot;
in the PoS seing, this property is guaranteed with digital signatures.
We begin by studying this algorithm in the simple, synchronous model posited by Blum et. al [3]. e model
adopts a synchronous communication network in the presence of a rushing adversary: in particular,
A0. Any message broadcast by an honest participant at the beginning of a particular slot is received by the adver-
sary first, who may decide strategically and individually for each recipient in the network whether to inject
additional messages and in which order all messages are to be delivered prior to the conclusion of the slot.
See the comments prior to Section 2.1 for further discussion of this network assumption. A variant of this adversarial
message-ordering is presented in Section 2.3. e ∆-synchronous communication model is handled in Section 8.
Given this, it is easy to describe the behavior of the longest-chain rule when carried out by a group of honest
participants with the extra guarantee that exactly one is elected as leader in a slot: Assuming that the system is
initialized with a common “genesis block” corresponding to sl0, the players observe a common, linearly growing
blockchain:
0 1 2 . . .
Here node i represents the block broadcast by the leader of slot i and the arrows represent the direction of increasing
time.
e blockchain axioms: Informal discussion. e introduction of adversarial participants or multiple slot
leaders complicates the family of possible blockchains that could emerge from this process. To explore this in the
context of our protocols, we work with an abstract notion of a blockchain which ignores all internal structure. We
consider a fixed assignment of leaders to time slots, and assume that the blockchain uses a proof mechanism to
ensure that any block labeled with slot slt was indeed produced by a leader of slot slt; this is guaranteed in practice
by appropriate use of a secure digital signature scheme.
Specifically, we treat a blockchain as a sequence of abstract blocks, each labeled with a slot number, so that:
A1. e blockchain begins with a fixed “genesis” block, assigned to slot sl0.
A2. e (slot) labels of the blocks are in strictly increasing order.
It is further convenient to introduce the structure of a directed graph on our presentation, where each block is treated
as a vertex; in light of the first two axioms above, a blockchain is a path beginning with a special “genesis” vertex,
labeled 0, followed by vertices with strictly increasing labels that indicate which slot is associated with the block.
0 2 4 5 7 9
e protocols of interest call for honest players to add a single block during any slot. In particular:
A3. Let k ≥ 1 be an integer. If a slot slt was assigned to k honest players but no adversarial players, then k blocks
are created—during the entire protocol—each having the label slt.
Recall that blockchains are immutable in the sense that any block in the chain commits to the entire previous history
of the chain; this is achieved in practice by including with each block a collision-free hash of the previous block.
ese properties imply that any chain that includes a block issued by an honest player must also include that block’s
associated prefix in its entirety.
Aswe analyze the dynamics of blockchain algorithms, it is convenient tomaintain an entire family of blockchains
at once. As a maer of bookkeeping, when two blockchains agree on a common prefix, we can glue together the
associated paths to indicate this, as shown below.
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0 2 4 5
7 9
8 9
When we glue together many chains to form such a diagram, we call it a “fork”—the precise definition appears below.
Observe that while these two blockchains agree through the vertex (block) labeled 5, they contain (distinct) vertices
labeled 9; this reflects two distinct blocks associated with slot 9 which, in light of the axiom above, may be produced
by either an adversarial participant assigned to slot 9 or two honest participants, both assigned to slot 9.
Finally, as we assume that messages from honest players are delivered before the next slot begins, we note a
direct consequence of the longest chain rule:
A4. If two honestly generated blocks B1 and B2 are labeled with slots sl1 and sl2 for which sl1 < sl2, then the
length of the unique blockchain terminating at B1 is strictly less than the length of the unique blockchain
terminating at B2.
Recall that the honest participant(s) assigned to slot sl2 will be aware of the blockchain terminating at B1 that was
broadcast by an honest player in slot sl1 as a result of synchronicity; according to the longest-chain rule, B2 must
have been placed on a chain that was at least this long. In contrast, not all participants are necessarily aware of
all blocks generated by dishonest players, and indeed dishonest players may oen want to delay the delivery of an
adversarial block to a participant or show one block to some participants and show a completely different block to
others.
Characteristic strings, forks, and the formal axioms. Note that with the axioms we have discussed above,
whether or not a particular fork diagram (such as the one just above) corresponds to a valid execution of the protocol
depends on how the slots have been awarded to the parties by the leader election mechanism. We introduce the
notion of a “characteristic” string as a convenient means of representing information about slot leaders in a given
execution.
Definition 1 (Characteristic string). Let sl1, . . . , sln be a sequence of slots. A characteristic string w is an element of
{h, H, A}n. e string w is consistent with a particular execution of a blockchain protocol on these slots if for each t ∈ [n],
(i) if wt = A, the slot slt is assigned to at least one adversarial participant, (ii) if wt = h, the slot slt is assigned to a
unique, honest participant, and (iii) ifwt = H, the slot slt is assigned to at least one honest participant and no adversarial
participants.
Observe that when an execution corresponds to a characteristic string w, it also corresponds to any string obtained
from w by replacing h symbols with H symbols.
For two strings x and w on the same alphabet, we write x ≺ w if and only if x is a strict prefix of w. Similarly,
we write x  w if and only if either x = w or x ≺ w. e empty string ε is a prefix to any string. If wt ∈ {h, H},
we say that “slt is honest” and otherwise, we say that “slt is adversarial.” With this discussion behind us, we set
down the formal object we use to reflect the various blockchains adopted by honest players during the execution of
a blockchain protocol. is definition formalizes the blockchains axioms discussed above.
Definition 2 (Fork). Let w ∈ {h, H, A}n, P = {i : wi = h}, andQ = {j : wj = H}. A fork for the string w consists of
a directed and rooted tree F = (V,E) with a labeling ℓ : V → {0, 1, . . . , n}. We insist that each edge of F is directed
away from the root vertex and further require that
(F1) the root vertex r has label ℓ(r) = 0;
(F2) the labels of vertices along any directed path are strictly increasing;
(F3) each index i ∈ P is the label of exactly one vertex of F and each index j ∈ Q is the label of at least one vertex of
F ; and
(F4) for any indices i, j ∈ P ∪ Q, if i < j then the depth of a vertex with label i is strictly less than the depth of a
vertex with label j.
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Figure 1: A fork F for the characteristic string w = hAhAhHAAH; vertices appear with their labels and honest vertices
are highlighted with double borders. Note that the depths of the (honest) vertices associated with the honest indices
of w are strictly increasing. Note, also, that this fork has three disjoint paths of maximum depth. In addition, two
honest vertices have label 6 and two more have label 9, indicating the fact that two honest leaders are associated
with each of the (honest) slots 6 and 9. Honest vertices with the same label are concurrent and, therefore, cannot
extend each other. Note that the two honest vertices with label 6 extend different vertices with the same depth. is
is allowed since any tie in the longest-chain rule is broken by the adversary.
If F is a fork for the characteristic string w, we write F ⊢ w. e conditions (F1)–(F4) are analogues of the
axioms A1–A4 above. e formal reflection of axiom A3 by condition (F3) deserves further comment: We have
chosen a definition of characteristic string that does not indicate the number of honest victories in cases where there
may be many; in particular, the symbol H may be associated with any positive number of (honest) vertices in the
fork. Indeed, we even permit a fork to have a single honest vertex associated with such a symbol, which enlarges the
class of forks under consideration for a particular characteristic string. is strengthens our results by effectively
giving the adversary the option to treat H symbols as h symbols. See Fig. 1 for an example fork.
A final notational convention: If F ⊢ x and Fˆ ⊢ w, we say that F is a prefix of Fˆ , wrien F ⊑ Fˆ , if x  w and
F appears as a consistently-labeled subgraph of Fˆ . (Specifically, each path of F appears, with identical labels, in Fˆ .)
Let w be a characteristic string. e directed paths in the fork F ⊢ w originating from the root are called tines;
these are abstract representations of blockchains. (Note that a tine may not terminate at a leaf of the fork.) We
naturally extend the label function ℓ for tines: i.e., ℓ(t) , ℓ(v) where the tine t terminates at vertex v. e length of
a tine t is denoted by length(t).
Viable tines. e longest-chain rule dictates that honest players build on chains that are at least as long as all
previously broadcast honest chains. It is convenient to distinguish such tines in the analysis: specifically, a tine t
of F is called viable if its length is no smaller than the depth of any honest vertex v for which ℓ(v) ≤ ℓ(t). A tine
t is viable at slot s if the length of the portion of t appearing over slots 0, . . . , s is no smaller than the depths of
any honest vertices labeled from these slots. (As noted, the properties (F3) and (F4) together imply that an honest
observer at slot s will only adopt a viable tine.) e honest depth function d : P ∪ Q → [n], defined as d(i) =
maxt∈F {length(t) : ℓ(t) = i}, gives the largest depth of the (honest) vertices associated with an honest slot; by (F4),
d(·) is strictly increasing.
2.1 Slot settlement and the Unique Vertex Property
We are now ready to explore the power of an adversary in this seing who has corrupted a (perhaps evolving)
coalition of the players. We focus on the possibility that such an adversary can violate the consistency of the honest
players’ blockchains. In particular, we consider the possibility that, at some time t, the adversary conspires to produce
two maximum-length blockchains that diverge prior to a previous slot s ≤ t; in this case honest players adopting the
longest-chain rule may clearly disagree about the history of the blockchain aer slot s. We call such a circumstance
a selement violation.
To express this in our abstract language, let F ⊢ w be a fork corresponding to an execution with characteristic
string w. Such a selement violation induces two viable tines t1, t2 with the same length that diverge prior to a
particular slot of interest. We record this below.
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e (D, T ; s, k)-settlement game
1. A characteristic string w ∈ {h, H, A}T is drawn from D. (is reflects the results of the leader election mecha-
nism.)
2. Let A0 ⊢ ε denote the initial fork for the empty string ε consisting of a single node corresponding to the
genesis block.
3. For each slot slt, t = 1, . . . , T in increasing order:
(a) (Honest slot.) is case pertains to wt ∈ {h, H}. If wt = h then A sets k = 1. If wt = H then A chooses
an arbitrary integer k ≥ 1. e challenger is then given k and the fork At−1 ⊢ w1 . . . wt−1. He must
determine a new fork Ft ⊢ w1 . . . wt by adding k new vertices (all labeled with t) to At−1. Each new
vertex is added at the end of a maximum-length path in At−1. If there are multiple candidatesa for this
path, A may break the tie. If k ≥ 2, multiple vertices (all with label t) may be added at the end of the
same path.
(b) (Adversarial slot.) If wt = A, this is an adversarial slot. A may set Ft ⊢ w1 . . . wt to be an arbitrary fork
for which At−1 ⊑ Ft.
(c) (Adversarial augmentation.) A determines an arbitrary fork At ⊢ w1 . . . , wt for which Ft ⊑ At.
Recall that F ⊑ F ′ indicates that F ′ contains, as a consistently-labeled subgraph, the fork F .
A wins the selement game if slot s is not k-seled in some fork At, t ≥ s+ k.
a It is possible that all maximum-length tines are honest. In the selement game considered in [4], at least one of these tines was adversarial.
Definition 3 (Selement with parameters s, k ∈ N). Let n ∈ N and let w be a characteristic string of length n. Let
t ∈ [s + k, n] be an integer, wˆ  w, |wˆ| = t, and let F be any fork for wˆ. We say that a slot s is not k-seled in F if
F contains two maximum-length tines C1, C2 that “diverge prior to s,” i.e., they either contain different vertices labeled
with s, or one contains a vertex labeled with s while the other does not. Otherwise, we say that slot s is k-seled in F .
We say that slot s is k-seled in w if, for each t ≥ s+ k, it is k-seled in every fork F ⊢ wˆ where wˆ  w, |wˆ| = t.
Definition 4 (Boleneck Property (BP) and Unique Vertex Property (UVP)). Let w ∈ {h, H, A}T be a characteristic
string. A slot s ∈ [T ] is said to have the boleneck property in w if, for any fork F ⊢ w and any k ≥ s + 1, every
tine viable at the onset of slot k contains, as its prefix, some vertex with label s. Slot s is said to have the Unique Vertex
Property if, for any fork F ⊢ w, there is a unique vertex u ∈ F with label s so that for any k ≥ s+ 1, all tines viable
at the onset of slot k contain, as their common prefix, the vertex u.
us if a uniquely honest slot in w has the boleneck property, it has the UVP as well. As a consistency
property, UVP has several advantages over slot selement. First, it easily implies the slot selement property: let
w ∈ {h, H, A}T , s ∈ [T ], and k ∈ [T − s].
If a slot t ∈ [s, s+ k] has UVP in w then s is k-seled in w. (1)
In addition, UVP has a straightforward characterization using “Catalan slots” (see eorem 3) and “relative margin”
(see Lemma 1); these characterizations are amenable to stochastic analysis. Finally, since UVP is structurally reminis-
cent of the traditional common prefix (CP) violations, UVP easily implies CP. e analogous statement “selement
implies CP,” however, requires a lengthy proof both in [3] and in our framework. See Appendix A for details.
2.2 Adversarial attacks on settlement time; the settlement game
To clarify the relationship between forks and the chains at play in a canonical blockchain protocol, we define a game-
based model below that explicitly describes the relationship between forks and executions. By design, the probability
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that the adversary wins this game is at most the probability that a slot s is not k-seled.
Consider the (D, T ; s, k)-selement game (presented in the box), played between an adversaryA and a challenger
C with a leader electionmechanismmodeled by an ideal distributionD. Intuitively, the game should reflect the ability
of the adversary to achieve a selement violation; that is, to present two maximum-length viable blockchains to a
future honest observer, thus forcing them to choose between two alternate histories which disagree on slot s. e
challenger plays the role(s) of the honest players during the protocol.
It is important to note that the game bestows the player A with the power to choose the number of honest
vertices in a multiply honest slot. Note that this seing makes the player strictly more powerful and, importantly,
implies that the game is completely determined by the choices made by A (i.e., the actions of the challenger are
deterministic). Consequently, in Definition 5, we can use a single, implicit universal quantifier over all strategies A;
no choices of the challenger are actually necessary to fully describe the game.
Definition 5 (Selement insecurity). Let D be a distribution on {h, H, A}T . Let w ∼ D be the string used in the first
step of a (D, T ; s, k)-selement game G. e (s, k)-selement insecurity of D is defined as
S
s,k[D] , max
wˆw
|wˆ|≥s+k
max
F⊢wˆ
Pr
[
F has two maximum-length tines
that diverge prior to slot s
]
.
Note that the probability in the right-hand side is the same as the probability that A wins G.
Note that in typical PoS seings the distribution D is determined by the combined stake held by the adversarial
players, the leader election mechanism, and the dynamics of the protocol. e most common case (as seen in Snow
White [2], Ouroboros [8], and Ouroboros Praos [5]) guarantees that the characteristic stringw = w1 . . . wT is drawn
from an i.i.d. distribution for whichPr[wi = A] ≤ (1−ǫ)/2 for some ǫ ∈ (0, 1); here the constant (1−ǫ)/2 is directly
related to the stake held by the adversary. Some seings involving adaptive adversaries (e.g., Ouroboros Praos [5])
yield a weaker martingale-type guarantee that Pr[wi = A | w1, . . . , wi−1] ≤ (1 − ǫ)/2. We can easily handle both
types of distributions in our analysis since the former distribution “stochastically dominates” the laer. As a rule,
we denote the probability distribution associated with a random variable using uppercase script leers.
Definition 6 (Stochastic dominance). Let X and Y be random variables taking values in some set Ω endowed with a
partial order ≤. We say that X stochastically dominates Y , wrien Y  X , if X (A) ≥ Y(A) for all monotone sets
A ⊆ Ω, where a set A ⊆ Ω is called monotone if a ∈ A implies a′ ∈ A for all a ≤ a′. As a special case, when Ω = R,
Y  X if Pr[X ≥ Λ] ≥ Pr[Y ≥ Λ] for every Λ ∈ R. We extend this notion to probability distributions in the natural
way.
roughout the paper, we adopt the following partial order on {h, H, A}T : If T = 1, define h < H < A. Otherwise,
for two strings xa, yb ∈ {h, H, A}T , |a| = |b| = 1, xa ≤ yb if and only if x ≤ y and a ≤ b. When x ≤ y, one might
say that y is “more adversarial” than x: indeed, if F ⊢ x and x ≤ y then F ⊢ y so that any selement violation for
x induces a selement violation for y.
Definition 7 ((ǫ, ph)-Bernoulli condition). Let T ∈ N, ǫ ∈ (0, 1), and ph ∈ [0, (1+ ǫ)/2]. Define pA = (1− ǫ)/2 and
pH = 1− pA− ph. A random variable w = w1 . . . wT taking values in {h, H, A}T is said to satisfy the (ǫ, ph)-Bernoulli
condition if each wi, i ∈ [T ], is independent and identically distributed as follows: Pr[wi = σ] = pσ for σ ∈ {h, H, A}.
e distribution of w is also said to satisfy the (ǫ, ph)-Bernoulli condition.
We frequently use the notation pH and pA in the context of such a random variable when ǫ and ph can be inferred
from context.
eorem 1 (Main theorem). Let ǫ, ph ∈ (0, 1) and s, k, T ∈ N. Let B be a distribution on length-T characteristic
strings satisfying the (ǫ, ph)-Bernoulli condition. en S
s,k[B] ≤ exp (−k · Ω(min(ǫ3, ǫ2ph)). Furthermore, letW be
a distribution on {h, H, A}T so thatW  B. en Ss,k[W ] ≤ Ss,k[B]. (Here, the asymptotic notation hides constants
that do not depend on ǫ or k.)
Note that the quantity ph above cannot be zero. We present the proof in Section 4. In Section 6, we give a
characterization of the UVP which allows us to explicitly compute Ss,k[B]; see eorem 5 and Section 6.6.
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Analysis in the∆-synchronous setting. e security game above most naturally models a blockchain protocol
over a synchronous network with immediate delivery (because each “honest” play of the challenger always builds
on a fork that contains the fork generated by previous honest plays). However, the model can be easily adapted to
protocols in the ∆-synchronous model by applying the ∆-reduction mapping of [5] (which is specifically designed
to li the synchronous analysis to the ∆-synchronous seing). ese details appear in Section 8.
Public leader schedules. One aractive feature of this model is that it gives the adversary full information about
the future schedule of leaders. e analysis of some protocols indeed demand this (e.g., Ouroboros, Snow White).
Other protocols—especially those designed to offer security against adaptive adversaries (Praos, Genesis)—in fact
contrive to keep the leader schedule private. Of course, as our analysis is in the more difficult “full information”
model, it applies to all of these systems.
Bootstrappingmulti-phase algorithms; stake shi. We remark that several existing proof-of-stake blockchain
protocols proceed in phases, each of which is obligated to generate the randomness (for leader election, say) for
the next phase based on the current stake distribution. e blockchain security properties of each phase are then
individually analyzed—assuming clean randomness—which yields a recursive security argument; in this context the
game outlined above precisely reflects the single phase analysis.
2.3 A consistent longest-chain selection rule
Let us modify axiom A0 as follows:
A0′. In addition to axiom A0, an arbitrary but consistent longest-chain tie-breaking rule is used by all honest
participants.
As a consequence, if two honest participants observe the same set of blockchains of maximum length, they will
extend the same blockchain.
Definition 8 (Bivalent characteristic string). Let sl1, . . . , sln be a sequence of slots. A bivalent characteristic string
w is an element of {H, A}n defined for a particular execution of a blockchain protocol on these slots so that for t ∈ [n],
wt = A if slt is assigned to an adversarial participant, and wt = H otherwise.
e definition of a fork for a bivalent characteristic string is identical to Definition 2 (somewhat simplified as a
bivalent string does not contain any h symbol). Also note that the (ǫ, 0)-condition from Definition 7 is well-defined
for bivalent characteristic strings.
Let w be a bivalent characteristic string, F a fork for w, and F ′ a fork for wH so that F ⊑ F ′ and any honest
vertex in F ′ \ F has label |w| + 1. If F contains a maximum-length adversarial tine, there is no guarantee that two
honest observers at slot |w| + 1 will agree on the longest chain: the adversary may chose to expose the adversarial
chain to one and not the other. In this case, we say that F has a tie for the longest-chain rule—or, in short, that F
has an LCR tie. When there is no LCR tie (that is, no maximum-length adversarial tine), all honest slot leaders at slot
|w|+ 1 necessarily extend the same honest tine determined by the consistent longest-chain tie-breaking rule.
eorem 2 (Main theorem; consistent tie-breaking). Let ǫ ∈ (0, 1) and s, k, T ∈ N. Let B be a distribution on
length-T bivalent characteristic strings satisfying the (ǫ, 0)-Bernoulli condition. LetW be a distribution on {H, A}T so
thatW  B. en Ss,k[W ] ≤ Ss,k[B] ≤ exp(−k · Ω(ǫ3(1 + O(ǫ)))). (Here, the asymptotic notation hides constants
that do not depend on ǫ or k.)
e proof is deferred to Section 4. Note that the theorem above states that a PoS protocol can achieve optimal
consistency error even with a leader election scheme that produces no uniquely honest slots. In contrast, eorem 1
requires a non-zero probability for uniquely honest slots.
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3 Unique Vertex Property via Catalan slots
As we have outlined before, if slot t in a characteristic string w has the Unique Vertex Property (UVP) then the slots
s = 1, . . . , t are seled in every fork for w. e goal of this section is to characterize when a slot has the UVP. (In
Section 6, we show an alternative way to characterize the UVP; see Lemma 1.)
We start with laying down some structural properties of forks. Next, we define the so-called Catalan slots and
show that if a slot is Catalan then in every fork, all sufficiently long blockchains must contain a block from that slot.
Next, we show that this implication is actually an equivalence. Finally, we revisit the above implication assuming
that the honest players use a consistent longest-chain tie-breaking rule.
3.1 Viable blockchains
A vertex of a fork is said to be honest if it is labeled with an index i such that wi ∈ {h, H}; otherwise, it is said to be
adversarial.
Definition 9 (Tines, length, and height). Let F ⊢ w be a fork for a characteristic string. A tine of F is a directed path
starting from the root. For any tine t we define its length to be the number of edges in the path, and for any vertex v
we define its depth to be the length of the unique tine that ends at v. If a tine t1 is a strict prefix of another tine t2, we
write t1 ≺ t2. Similarly, if t1 is a non-strict prefix of t2, we write t1  t2. e longest common prefix of two tines t1, t2
is denoted by t1 ∩ t2. at is, ℓ(t1 ∩ t2) = max{ℓ(u) : u  t1 and u  t2}. e height of a fork (as is usual for a tree)
is the length of the longest tine, denoted by height(F ).
Let F ⊢ xy and two tines t1, t2 ∈ F are disjoint over y. We say that these tines are y-disjoint; equivalently, we
also say that t1 is y-disjoint with t2.
When an adversary builds a fork, it is natural to imagine that he “grows” an existing fork by adding new vertices
and edges.
Definition 10 (Fork prefixes). Let w, x ∈ {h, H, A}∗ so that x  w. Let F, F ′ be two forks for x and w, respectively.
We say that F is a prefix of F ′ if F is a consistently labeled subgraph of F ′. at is, all vertices and edges of F also
appear in F ′ and the label of any vertex appearing in both F and F ′ is identical. We denote this relationship by F ⊑ F ′.
When speaking about a tine that appears in both F and F ′, we place the fork in the subscript of relevant properties.
For any string x (on any alphabet) and a symbol σ in that alphabet, define #σ(x) as the number of appearances
of σ in x. When a characteristic string w ∈ {h, H, A}T is fixed from the context, we extend this notation to sub-
intervals of [T ] in a natural way: For integers i, j ∈ [T ], i ≤ j, let I = [i, j] ⊂ [T ] be a closed interval and define
#σ(I) = #σ(wi . . . wj) for σ ∈ {h, H, A}. A characteristic string w is called hH-heavy if #h(w) + #H(w) > #1(x);
otherwise, it is called A-heavy. For a given characteristic string w of length T , an interval I = [i, j] ⊆ [T ] is called
A-heavy if the substring wi . . . wj is A-heavy.
Adversarial extensions. Let x, y be two characteristic strings and |y| ≥ 0. Let F be a fork for x and let B be an
honest tine in F . We say that B has an adversarial extension if there is a fork F ′ ⊢ xy, F ⊑ F ′ and an adversarial
tine t ∈ F ′ so thatB ≺ t and B is the last honest vertex on t. Note that t can be made disjoint with any F -tine over
the interval [ℓ(B) + 1, ℓ(t)].
Viable adversarial extensions and A-heaviness. Let w ∈ {h, H, A}T , s ∈ [T + 1], and F ⊢ w1 . . . ws−1 an
arbitrary fork. Let B ∈ F be an honest vertex and t a maximum-length honest tine in F . Consider the following
statements:
(a) B has an adversarial extension viable at the onset of slot s.
(b) e interval I = [ℓ(B) + 1, s− 1] is A-heavy.
(c) length(t) = #h(I) + #H(I) + length(B).
Fact 1. (a) =⇒ (b). In addition, if we assume (c), then (b) =⇒ (a).
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Proof.
(a) implies (b). Let F ′ ⊢ w1 . . . ws−1 be a fork so that F ⊑ F ′ and B has an adversarial extension t′ ∈ F ′ viable at
the onset of slot s. Considering the interval I , the longest honest tine in F ′ grows by at least #h(I) + #H(I)
vertices. Since the viable tine t′ contains only adversarial vertices from the interval I , it follows that #A(I)
must be at least #h(I) + #H(I). Hence, I is A-heavy.
(c) and (b) implies (a). Since I is A-heavy, I contains at least #h(I) + #H(I) = length(t) − length(B) adversarial
slots. us, we can augment B by adding length(t)− length(B) adversarial vertices from these slots so that
the resulting adversarial extension is viable at the onset of slot s.
Corollary 1. Let w be a characteristic string, F be any fork for w, and let t be any tine in F . Let B1 and B2 be two
honest vertices on t such that (i) ℓ(B1) < ℓ(B2), (ii) t contains only adversarial vertices from I = [ℓ(B1)+1, ℓ(B2)−1],
and (iii) t contains at least one vertex from I . en I is A-heavy.
Proof. By assumption, the honest vertex B2 builds on some adversarial tine t
′ that is viable at the onset of slot ℓ(B2)
and, importantly, contains B1 as its last honest vertex. By Fact 1, the interval I is A-heavy.
3.2 Catalan slots and the UVP
Below, we define the so-called Catalan slots and show, in eorems 3 and 4, that certain Catalan slots have the UVP.
Definition 11 (Catalan slot). Let w ∈ {h, H, A}T be a characteristic string and let s ∈ [T ] be an integer. s is called a
le-Catalan slot in w if, for any integer ℓ ∈ [s], the interval [ℓ, s] is hH-heavy in w. s is called a right-Catalan slot in
w if, for any integer r ∈ [s, T ], the interval [s, r] is hH-heavy in w. Finally, s is called a Catalan slot in w if it is both
le- and right-Catalan in w.
Observe that a le- or right-Catalan slot must be honest. In addition, the slot before a le-Catalan (resp., aer a
right-Catalan) slot must be honest as well. us the slots adjacent to a Catalan slot must be honest. A Catalan slot c
acts as a barrier for adversarial tine extensions in that in any fork, every tine viable at the onset of slot c + 1 must
be honest.
Fact 2. Let w ∈ {h, H, A}T be a characteristic string and s a le-Catalan slot in w. In any fork for w, every viable tine
at the onset of slot s+ 1 is an honest tine from slot s.
Proof. Let τ be the longest tine with label s. (τ is an honest tine. If s is a uniquely honest slot, τ is unique. Otherwise,
τ is unique up to tie-breaking among equally-long tines.) We claim that all adversarial tines t ∈ F, ℓ(t) ≤ s− 1 are
strictly shorter than τ . Suppose, towards a contradiction, that t is a viable adversarial tine at the onset of slot s+ 1,
i.e., ℓ(t) ≤ s− 1 and length(t) ≥ length(τ). Let B be the last honest vertex on t; necessarily, ℓ(B) < s. According
to Fact 1, the interval [ℓ(B)+1, s] is A-heavy. But this contradicts the assumption that s is a le-Catalan slot. Hence
the adversarial tine t cannot be viable.
Observation 1. If s is a Catalan slot for w, Fact 2 implies that in every fork for w, an honest slot leader at slot s+1
always builds on top of an honest tine with label s; this tine, in fact, will have the maximum length among all tines
with label s.
Fact 3. Let w ∈ {h, H, A}T be a characteristic string. If an honest slot in w has the boleneck property then it is a
Catalan slot.
Proof. Let s ∈ [T ] be an honest slot in w. We will prove the contrapositive: namely, that if s is not Catalan then s
does not have the boleneck property.
Suppose s is not a Catalan slot. en there must be some a, b ∈ [T ] so that I = [a, b] is the largest A-heavy
interval which includes s. Necessarily, either b = T , or b+1must be an honest slot. Likewise, either a = 1, or a− 1
must be an honest slot.
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Let F be a fork for w1 . . . wb and let u ∈ F, ℓ(u) = a − 1 be an honest tine. (If a = 1, we can take u as the
root vertex.) Let t be a maximum-length honest tine in F and assume that length(t) = length(u) +#h(I) +#H(I).
Since I is A-heavy, Fact 1 states that it is possible to augment u into an adversarial extension t′ viable at the onset of
slot b+1. As t′ will not contain any vertex from the honest slot s, s does not have the boleneck property in w.
e following theorem shows that a uniquely honest Catalan slot has the UVP.
eorem 3. Letw ∈ {h,H,A}T be a characteristic string. Let s ∈ [T ] be a uniquely honest slot in w. Slot s is Catalan
in w if and only if it has the UVP in w.
Proof. (e reverse implication.) Since s has the UVP it satisfies the (weaker) boleneck property. By Fact 3, the
honest slot s must be Catalan.
(e forward implication.) By assumption, slot s has a unique honest leader. Let τ be the unique honest tine at
slot s. By Fact 2, the honest tine τ is the only viable tine at the onset of slot s+ 1. If s = T then τ is the only viable
tine at the onset of slot T + 1. Now suppose s ≤ T − 1. As s is a Catalan slot, slots s and s+ 1 must be honest. Let
t be a viable tine at the onset of some slot k, k ≥ s+ 2. We claim that τ must be a prefix of t.
Suppose, for a contradiction, that t does not contain τ as its prefix. Let B1 be the last honest vertex on t such
that ℓ(B1) ≤ s − 1. (If s = 1 or no such vertex can be found, take B1 as the root vertex.) Likewise, let B2 be the
first honest vertex, if it exists, on t such that ℓ(B2) ∈ [s+ 1, k − 1].
Suppose B2 exists. If ℓ(B2) = s+1 then, by Observation 1, B2 builds on τ , contradicting our assumption that τ
is not a prefix of t. Otherwise, suppose ℓ(B2) ∈ [s+2, k− 1]. Let I be the interval [ℓ(B1)+ 1, ℓ(B2)− 1]. Clearly, I
contains s. If t contains any adversarial vertex between B1 and B2 then, by Corollary 1, I must be A-heavy; but this
contradicts the assumption that s is a Catalan slot. Otherwise, B2 builds on top of B1 and, in particular, B1 must
be viable at the onset of slot ℓ(B2) ≥ s + 1. Since ℓ(τ) = s, this means length(B1) ≥ length(τ). However, since
ℓ(B1) < s, by the monotonicity of the honest-depth function d(·), length(τ) ≥ 1 + length(B1). is contradicts
the inequality above.
Now suppose B2 does not exist. We claim that t is an adversarial tine. To see why, note that if t were honest
and ℓ(t) ≥ s + 1 then there would have been a B2. Since s is a uniquely honest slot and τ is not a prefix of t by
assumption, ℓ(t) 6= s if t is honest.
Finally, if t is honest and ℓ(t) ≤ s−1 then, by Fact 2, t cannot be viable at the onset of slot s+1 since s is Catalan.
Since s + 1 is an honest slot, honest tines with label s + 1 will be strictly longer than t and, therefore, t cannot be
viable at the onset of slot k ≥ s+ 2 either. We conclude that t must be an adversarial tine viable at the onset of slot
k. By Fact 1, the interval I = [ℓ(B1)+ 1, k− 1]must be A-heavy. However, since I contains s, it contradicts the fact
that s is a Catalan slot.
It follows that every viable tine t ∈ F, ℓ(t) ≥ s+ 1 must contain τ as its prefix.
e following theorem shows that under axiom A0′, two consecutive Catalan slots imply that the first slot has
the UVP.
eorem 4. Let w ∈ {H, A}T be a bivalent characteristic string and axiom A0′ is satisfied. Let s ∈ [2, T ] be an integer
such that s and s−1 are two honest slots inw. e following statements are equivalent: (i) Slots s, s−1 are Catalan. (ii) If
s ≤ T − 1, both s and s− 1 have the UVP. Otherwise, slot T − 1 has the UVP but slot T has the boleneck property.
Proof. Since the slots s, s− 1 satisfy the (weaker) boleneck property, Fact 3 implies that they must be Catalan slots.
is proves (ii) implies (i).
Now let us prove that (i) implies (ii). Slots s, s− 1 are Catalan. Let Vs (resp. Vs+1) be the set of all viable tines
at the onset of slot s (resp. slot s + 1). Since s − 1 (resp. s) is a Catalan slots, we use Fact 2 and conclude that Vs
(resp. Vs+1) can contain only maximum-length honest tines t, ℓ(t) = s − 1 (resp. ℓ(t) = s). Let us ∈ Vs be the
unique vertex determined by the consistent tie-breaking rule when applied to the set Vs. Define us+1 ∈ Vs+1 in an
analogous way for the set Vs+1.
Let k ∈ [s + 1, T + 1] be an integer. We wish tho show that for every tine t viable at the onset of slot k, the
following holds: (i) if s ≤ T − 1 then us ≺ us+1  t, and (ii) if s = T then uT−1 ≺ t where ℓ(t) = T .
All tines at the honest slot s build upon us. If s = T , we are done. Otherwise, i.e., if s ≤ T − 1, let τ = us+1 and
note that us ≺ us+1 = τ . If k = s+ 1, we are done since by Fact 2, every tine at the honest slot k will build upon τ .
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It remains to reason about the case s ≤ T − 2 and k ≥ s+2. Consider a tine t which is viable at the onset of slot
k. (All we know about t’s label is that ℓ(t) ≤ k − 1.) We claim that τ ≺ t. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that τ
is not a prefix of t. Let B1 be the last honest vertex on t such that ℓ(B1) ≤ s − 1. (If no such vertex can be found,
take B1 as the root vertex.) Likewise, let B2 be the first honest vertex on t such that ℓ(B2) ∈ [s+ 1, k − 1].
Below, we show that every choice for B1, B2 leads to a contradiction and, therefore, τ must be a prefix of t. If
B2 exists then, by construction, ℓ(B1) < s < ℓ(B2) ≤ k − 1. If ℓ(B2) = s+ 1 then, as we have argued earler, B2
must have built on τ . is contradicts our assumption that τ is not a prefix of t. Otherwise, suppose ℓ(B2) ≥ s+ 2.
Let I be the interval [ℓ(B1) + 1, ℓ(B2)− 1] and note that I contains s. ere can be two scenarios. If t contains an
adversarial vertex between B1 and B2 then, by Corollary 1, I must be A-heavy; but this contradicts the assumption
that s is a Catatan slot. Otherwise, B2 builds on top of B1 and, in particular, B1 must be viable at the onset of slot
ℓ(B2) ≥ s+1. Since ℓ(τ) = s, this means length(B1) ≥ length(τ). However, since ℓ(B1) < s, by the monotonicity
of the honest-depth function d(·), length(τ) ≥ 1 + length(B1). is contradicts the inequality above.
If B2 does not exist then we claim that t is an adversarial tine. To see why, note that if t were honest and ℓ(t) ≥
s+1 then there would have been aB2. If twere honest with ℓ(t) = s, t 6= τ then twould not be viable at the onset of
slot s+2. is is because s is a Catalan slot and as such, each vertex from slot s+1 builds on τ, length(τ) ≥ length(t).
Hence tines viable at the onset of slot s + 2 must have length at least 1 + length(τ) > length(t). Finally, if t is
honest and ℓ(t) ≤ s − 1 then, by Fact 2, t cannot be viable at the onset of slot s + 1 since s is Catalan. Since s + 1
is an honest slot, honest tines with label s+ 1 will be strictly longer than t and, therefore, t cannot be viable at the
onset of slot k ≥ s+ 2 either. We conclude that t must be an adversarial tine viable at the onset of slot k. By Fact 1,
the interval I = [ℓ(B1) + 1, k − 1] must be A-heavy. However, since I contains s, it contradicts the fact that s is a
Catalan slot.
4 Main theorems via tail bounds for Catalan slots
In the previous section, we explored the structural connection between the UVP and Catalan slots. In this section,
we present two bounds on the stochastic event “Catalan slots are rare.” Specifically, Bound 1 concerns uniquely
honest Catalan slots and complementseorem 3; Bound 2 concerns two consecutive Catalan slots and complements
eorem 4. We defer the proofs till the next section and prove the main theorems below.
Recall the (ǫ, ph)-Bernoulli condition from 7.
Bound 1. Let T, s, k ∈ N, T ≥ s+ k and ǫ, qh ∈ (0, 1). Let w be a characteristic string satisfying the (ǫ, qh)-Bernoulli
condition and let y = ws . . . ws+k−1 . en
Pr
w
[w does not contain a uniquely honest Catalan slot in y] ≤ exp (−k · Ω(min(ǫ3, ǫ2qh))) .
In particular, when qh = (1 + ǫ)/2, the bound above coincides with the bound in [3]; it follows that the current
analysis subsumes their result.
Bound 2. Let T, s, k ∈ N, T ≥ s + k and ǫ ∈ (0, 1). Let w be a bivalent characteristic string satisfying the (ǫ, 0)-
Bernoulli condition and let y = ws . . . ws+k−1. en
Pr
w
[w does not contain two consecutive Catalan slots in y] ≤ exp (−k · Ω(ǫ3(1 +O(ǫ)))) .
Proof of eorem 1. We consider the distribution B first. Write w = xyz, |x| = s − 1. Recall that Ss,k[B] =
Prw∼B[s is not k-seled in w]. eorem 3 and Equation (1) implies that if w contains a uniquely honest Catalan slot
c ∈ [s, s+ k] then slot s must be k-seled in w. In fact, by virtue of Fact 2, it suffices to take c ∈ [s, s+ k − 1], i.e.,
|x| ≤ c ≤ |xy|. us the probability above is bounded by Bound 1 which renames ph = qh. is proves the first
inequality.
Now let us prove the second inequality. For any player playing the selement game, letC be the set of strings on
which the player wins. Clearly, C is monotone with respect to the partial order ≤ defined on {h, H, A}T (see below
Definition 6). To see why, note that if the player wins on a specific string w, he can certainly win on any string w′ so
thatw ≤ w′. By assumption,W  B. It follows fromDefinition 6 thatPrW [w] ≤ PrB[w] for anyw in the monotone
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set C . By referring to the definition of selement insecurity (see Definition 5), we conclude that Ss,k[W ] ≤ Ss,k[B].
Proof of eorem 2. is proof is identical to the proof of eorem 1 except that we need to refer to eorem 4
in lieu of eorem 3 and Bound 2 in lieu of Bound 1.
5 Proofs of Bounds 1 and 2
As a rule, we denote the probability distribution associated with a random variable using uppercase script leers.
Observe that if Y  X and Z is independent of both X and Y , then Z + Y  Z + X . In addition, for any
non-decreasing function u defined on Ω, Y  X implies u(Y ) ≤ u(X).
Generating functions. We reserve the term generating function to refer to an “ordinary” generating function
which represents a sequence a0, a1, . . . of non-negative real numbers by the formal power series A(Z) =
∑∞
t=0 atZ
t.
We denote the above correspondence as {at} ←→ A(Z). When A(1) =
∑
t at = 1 we say that the generating
function is a probability generating function; in this case, the generating function A can naturally be associated with
the integer-valued random variable A for which Pr[A = k] = ak. If the probability generating functions A and B
are associated with the random variables A and B, it is easy to check that A ·B is the generating function associated
with the convolution A+ B (where A and B are assumed to be independent). Translating the notion of stochastic
dominance to the seing with generating functions, we say that the generating function A stochastically dominates
B if
∑
t≤T at ≤
∑
t≤T bt for all T ≥ 0; we write B  A to denote this state of affairs. If B1  A1 and B2  A2 then
B1 · B2  A1 · A2 and αB1 + βB2  αA1 + βA2 (for any α, β ≥ 0). Moreover, if B  A then it can be checked
that B(C)  A(C) for any probability generating function C(Z), where we write A(C) to denote the composition
A(C(Z)).
Finally, we remark that if A(Z) is a generating function which converges as a function of a complex Z for
|Z| < R for some non-negative R, R is called the radius of convergence of A. It follows from eorem 2.19 in [12]
that limk→∞ |ak|Rk = 0 and that |ak| = O(R−k). In addition, if A is a probability generating function associated
with the random variable A then it follows that Pr[A ≥ T ] = O(R−T ).
5.1 Proof of Bound 1
Let p = (1 − ǫ)/2 and q = (1 + ǫ)/2 so that q − p = ǫ. Let qH = q − qh. Let B denote the event that w does not
contain a uniquely honest Catalan slot in y. We would like to bound Prw[B] from above.
Define the processW = (Wt : t ∈ N),Wt ∈ {±1} asWt = 1 if and only if wt = A. Let S = (St : t ∈ N), St =∑
i≤tWi be the position of the particle at time t. us S is a random walk on Z with ǫ negative (i.e., downward)
bias. By convention, setW0 = S0 = 0.
Case 1: x is an empty string. In this case, we write w = yz so that |y| = k. Let ct be the probability that t is
the first uniquely honest Catalan slot in w with c0 = 0, and consider the probability generating function {ct} ←→
C(Z) =
∑∞
t=0 ctZ
t. Controlling the decay of the coefficients ct suffices to give a bound on Pr[B], i.e., the probability
that y does not contain a Catalan slot, because this probability is at most 1 −∑k−1t=0 ct = ∑∞t=k ct. To this end, we
develop a closed-form expression for a related probability generating function Cˆ(Z) =
∑
t cˆtZ
t which stochastically
dominates C(Z). Recall that this means that for any k,
∑
t≥k ck ≤
∑
t≥k cˆk . Finally, bound the laer sum by using
the analytic properties of Cˆ(Z).
Treating the random variablesW1, . . . as defining a (negatively) biased random walk, defineD (resp. A) to be the
generating function for the descent stopping time (resp. the ascent stopping time) of the walk; this is the first time the
random walk, starting at 0, visits −1 (resp. +1). e natural recursive formulation of these descent time yield simple
algebraic equations for the descent generating function, D(Z) = qZ + pZD(Z)2 and A(Z) = pZ + qZA(Z)2, and
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from this we may conclude
D(Z) = (1 −
√
1− 4pqZ2)/2pZ ,
A(Z) = (1 −
√
1− 4pqZ2)/2qZ .
Note that while D is a probability generating function, A is not: according to the classical “gambler’s ruin” analysis,
the probability that a negatively-biased random walk starting at 0 ever rises to 1 is exactly p/q; thus A(1) = p/q.
Recall that a slot is Catalan in w if and only if it is both le-Catalan and right-Catalan. A slot is le-Catalan if
the walk S descends to a new low at that slot. In addition, the same slot (say s) is right-Catalan if the walk never
reaches to that level in future, i.e., Ss ≥ Si, i ≥ s + 1. e probability of this event is 1 − A(1) = 1 − p/q = ǫ/q,
conditioned on the fact thatWs = −1.
Assume that the walk is now at its historical minimum. (It may or may not be a new minimum.) We can think of
the generating function C(Z) as a search procedure for finding the first uniquely honest Catalan slot. Let v be the
first symbol we observe. Let E(Z) be the generating function for a walk which makes an ascent with certainty and
then descends again to its historical minimum. We claim that
C(Z) = pZD(Z)C(Z) + qhZ · ǫ/q + qhZ · p/q · E(Z)C(Z) + qHZC(Z)
=
(qhǫ/q)Z
1− (pZD(Z) + (qhp/q)ZE(Z) + qHZ) . (2)
Here is the explanation. Regarding the value of v, there can be four alternatives for the walk which is currently at
its historical minimum:
(i) With probability p, we have v = A and the walk moves up. en we wait till the walk makes a first descent
and restart.
(ii) With probability qh · ǫ/q, we have v = h and the walk diverges below. Hence our search has succeeded and
we stop.
(iii) With probability qh ·(1−ǫ/q) = qhp/q, we have v = h and the walk returns to the origin from below. en we
wait for the walk to match its minimum again before we can restart. Note that E(Z) is the generating function
for this “guaranteed ascent then match minimum” walk.
(iv) With probability qH, we have v = H and the walk moves down. Since we will reach a new minimum, we restart.
Since E(1) = 1 by assumption, p+(qhp/q)+ qH = 1− qh(1−p/q) = 1− qhǫ/q. It follows that C(1) = (qhǫ/q)/(1−
(1 − qhǫ/q)) = 1; hence C(Z) is a probability generating function.
Instead of working directly with E(Z), we can work with a generating function Eˆ(Z) which is identical to
E(Z) for the initial ascending part but differs in the descending part. Specifically, in the descending part, the walk
represented by Eˆ(Z) descends as many levels as the number of steps it took to return to the origin. Clearly, E(Z) 
Eˆ(Z) , A(ZD(Z))/A(1). Here, an individual term in A(ZD(Z)) =
∑
i aiZ
i
D(Z)i has the interpretation “if the
first ascent took i steps then immediately descend i levels.” Since A(Z) is not a probability generating function, we
have to normalize it by A(1) to make sure that the ascent happens with certainty. Writing
F(Z) , pZD(Z) + qhZA(ZD(Z)) + qHZ ,
note that
C(Z)  Cˆ(Z) , (qhǫ/q)Z/(1− F(Z)) . (3)
Since F(1) = p + qhp/q + qH = 1 − qh(1 − p/q) = 1 − qhǫ/q, we have Cˆ(1) = 1, i.e., Cˆ(Z) is a probability
generating function. It remains to establish a bound on the radius of convergence of Cˆ. A sufficient condition for the
convergence of Cˆ(z) for some z ∈ R is that all generating functions appearing in the definition of Cˆ(z) converge at
z and that F(z) 6= 1.
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e generating functions D(z) and A(z) converge when the discriminant 1 − 4pqz2 is positive; equivalently
|z| < 1/√1− ǫ2 = 1+ ǫ2/2 +O(ǫ4). In addition, conditioned on the convergence of A(z) and D(z), we can check
that
A(z) < 1/2qz and D(z) < 1/2pz . (4)
On the other hand, the convergence of F(z) depends on the convergence of D(z) and A(zD(z)). e convergence
of A(zD(z)) is likewise determined by the positivity of its discriminant, i.e.,
1− (1− ǫ2)
(
z · 1−
√
1− (1− ǫ2)z2
(1− ǫ)z
)2
> 0 .
e inequality above implies that if A(zD(z)) converges when
|z| < R1 ,
((
2/
√
1− ǫ2 − 1/(1 + ǫ)
)
/(1 + ǫ)
)1/2
,
where
R1 = 1 + ǫ
3/2 +O(ǫ4) ≈ exp (ǫ3(1 +O(ǫ))/2) . (5)
Note that the radius of convergence of A(ZD(Z)) is smaller than that of A(Z) or D(Z).
We can check that when F(z) converges, it satisfies
F(z) ≤ F(|z|) .
e claim is trivial for z = 0. Otherwise, note that D(z) is an odd function and hence, zD(z) = |z|D(|z|). us,
for the claim to hold, we need only show that z (qhA(zD(z)) + qH) ≤ |z| (qhA(|z|D(|z|)) + qH). But the right-hand
side equals |z| (qhA(zD(z)) + qH) and A(x) > 0 for real x > 0, we can divide both sides by qhA(zD(z)) + qH. e
reduced inequality becomes z/|z| ≤ 1. However, z/|z| = ±1 for any non-zero real z. erefore, it suffices for us to
require that F (z) 6= 1 for z > 0.
We can also check that
F (z) is convex and increasing for z ∈ [0, R1) . (6)
To see why, note that since z2 is convex in z, (1−4pqz2) is concave. Since square root is non-decreasing and convex
for positive z,
√
1− 4pqz2 is concave and consequently, −
√
1− 4pqz2 is convex. Since 1/z2 is convex, it follows
that D(z) and, by a similar reasoning, A(z) are convex. Next, observe that A(zD(z)) converges for z ∈ [0, R1) and
hence it is also convex in z. us F(z) turns out to be a convex combination of convex functions; it follows that F (z)
is convex for z ∈ (0, R1). In addition, since F(0) = 0 and F(1) > 0, F(z) must be increasing as well.
Let
R2 be the solution to the equation F(z) = 1, z > 0 .
en Cˆ(z)would converge for |z| < R , min(R1, R2). It remains to characterizeR2 in terms of ǫ and qh. Note that
R1 < 2 as long as ǫ ≤ 0.97. Since the final bounds will be only asymptotic in ǫ, it suffices for us to consider small ǫ.
at is to say, we consider the case where 0 < z < R1 < 2, i.e., z − 1 < 1.
If we express F(z) as its power series around z = 1, we can check that
F(1) = 1− ǫqh/q ,
F
′′(1) =
1− ǫ
ǫ5
(
qh(1 + 3ǫ) + qHǫ
2
)
, and
F
′(1) = p(1 + 1/ǫ) + qh(p/q)
(
1 + (1 + 1/ǫ)/ǫ
)
+ qH .
Since F′′(1) > 0 and F(z) is convex and increasing, the first-order approximation
f(z) = (1− ǫqh/q) + F′(1)(z − 1) (7)
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is a lower bound for F(z) when 1 ≤ z < R1. e approximation error at any z ∈ (1, 2) is F(z)− f(z) = O(h(z))
where we define
h(z) , F′′(1)(z − 1)2 .
Since the bounds we develop will have either O(·) or Ω(·) in the exponent, it suffices to ensure that R2 = Θ(R∗2).
In the exposition below, we will only develop approximations R∗2 satisfying R2 = (1 − θ)R∗2 for a small positive
constant θ ∈ (0, 1).
In the special case qH = 0, F(Z) simplifies as F(Z) = pZD(Z)+ qZA(ZD(Z)). Note that F(Z) converges when
A(ZD(Z)) does and it is not hard to check that F(z) < 1. Specifically, we know that F(z) converges when z ∈ [0, R1)
and when it does, we claim that F(z) < 1. Specifically, when z ∈ [0, 1], F(z) ≤ F(1) = 1− ǫqh/q = 1− ǫ < 1 since
ǫ < 1. On the other hand, we can check thatD(z) is convex for z ≥ 0 and, in particular, the first order approximation
1+ (z− 1)/ǫ around z = 1 is a lower bound for D(z), z ≥ 1. It follows thatD(z) ≥ 1 for z ∈ [1, R1). Consequently,
F(z) ≤ pZD(Z)+ qzA(zD(z)) ·D(z) = pzD(z)+ qxA(x) < 1/2+1/2 = 1 where we write x = zD(z) and use (4).
us the radius of convergence of Cˆ is R1 if qH = 0.
e remainder of the exposition considers the general case 0 < qh < q. Let the solution to the equation f(z) = 1
be denoted by
R∗2 , 1 + ǫ(qh/q)/F
′(1) .
If qh is small, q = (1 + ǫ)/2, p+ ǫ = q and p/q
3 ∈ [1, 4], we can check that
h(R∗2) = O
(
pq
ǫ3
·
(
ǫ2qh/q
p(1 + ǫ) + ǫq
)2)
= O
(
ǫq2
h
· pq
q2 (p+ ǫ)2
)
= O
(
ǫq2
h
· p
q3
)
= O(ǫq2
h
) ,
i.e., it vanishes. us f(z) is a good approximation for F(z). It follows that F′(1) ≈ p(1 + 1/ǫ) + q = q/ǫ and,
therefore,
R∗2 ≈ 1 + (ǫqh/q)/(q/ǫ) = 1 + qh(ǫ/q)2 ≈ exp(ǫ2qh/q2) = eO(ǫ
2qh)
since q ∈ (1/2, 1). (Although we have an asymptotic notation, it is important that we have the right exponent on
qh.)
If, on the contrary, qh = O(1) but ǫ vanishes then F
′(1) will be dominated by its second term; that is to say,
F
′(1) ≈ qh(p/q) (1 + (1 + 1/ǫ)/ǫ) = O(qh/ǫ2) and, therefore,
R∗2 ≈ 1 +O
(
(ǫqh/q)/(qh/ǫ
2)
)
= 1 +O(ǫ3) = eO(ǫ
3)
since q ≈ 1/2.
Recall that R1 = exp
(
O(ǫ3(1 +O(ǫ)))
)
. It follows that Cˆ(z) converges for |z| less than
R = exp
(
O(min(ǫ3, ǫ2qh))
)
. (8)
Recall that if the radius of convergence of Cˆ is exp(δ) then cˆk = O(e
−δk). Hence, Pr[B] is a geometric sum and
it is at most O(e−δk) as well. We conclude that
Pr
w
[B] ≤ O (e−k lnR) = exp (−k · Ω(min(ǫ3, ǫ2qh))) .
Case 2: x is non-empty. Next, let us consider the case when x 6= ε, i.e., |x| ≥ 1. Letm = |x| and write w = xyz
where |y| = k. Recall the processes (Wt) and (St) defined on w and, in addition, define M = (Mt : t ∈ N),Mt =
min0≤i≤t Si and X = (Xt : t ∈ N), Xt = St −Mt. By convention, setM0 = X0 = 0. us Xt denotes the height
of the walk S, at time t, with respect to its minimumMt.
For a fixed value h = Xm, the relevant generating function would be D(Z)
h
Cˆ. Hence the final generating
function we seek is
C˜(Z) ,
∞∑
h=0
Pr[Xm = h] · D(Z)hCˆ(Z)
whose tth coefficient is the probability that t is a Catalan slot in y.
17
Note that X = (Xt) is an ǫ-downward biased random walk on non-negative integers with a reflective barrier
at −1. Specifically, for any h ∈ N,Pr[Xt = h | Xt−1 = h − 1] = p and Pr[Xt = h − 1 | Xt−1 = h] = Pr[Xt =
0 | Xt−1 = 0] = q. In [4, Lemma 6.1], it is proved that the distribution of Xm is stochastically dominated by the
distribution ofX∞, wrien X∞ and defined, for k = 0, 1, 2, . . ., as
X∞(k) = Pr[X∞ = k] ,
(
2ǫ
1 + ǫ
)
·
(
1− ǫ
1 + ǫ
)k
= (1− β)βk (9)
where β , (1− ǫ)/(1 + ǫ). Let
{X∞(k)} ←→ X∞(Z) = 1− β
1− βZ .
It follows that C˜(Z) is dominated by
∞∑
h=0
X∞(h)D(Z)hCˆ(Z) = X∞(D(Z))Cˆ(Z) = (1− β)Cˆ(Z)
1− βD(Z) .
Let ⋆ denote the quantity above. For it to converge, we need to check that D(Z) should never converge to 1/β.
Since the radius of convergence of D(Z)—which is (1 − ǫ2)−1/2—is strictly less than (1 + ǫ)/(1 − ǫ) for ǫ > 0, we
conclude that ⋆ converges if both D(Z) and Cˆ(Z) converge. e radius of convergence of ⋆ would be the smaller of
the radii of convergence of D(Z) and Cˆ(Z). We already know from the previous analysis that Cˆ(Z) has the smaller
radius of convergence of these two; therefore, the bound on Prw[B] from the previous case holds for |x| ≥ 0.
5.2 Proof of Bound 2
Let p = (1 − ǫ)/2 and q = 1 − p; thus q − p = ǫ. Let B denote the event that w does not contain two consecutive
Catalan slots in y. We would like to bound Prw[B] from above.
Define the processW = (Wt : t ∈ N),Wt ∈ {±1} asWt = 1 if and only if wt = A. Let S = (St : t ∈ N), St =∑
i≤tWi be the position of the particle at time t. us S is a random walk on Z with ǫ negative (i.e., downward)
bias. By convention, setW0 = S0 = 0.
Case 1: x is an empty string. In this case, we write w = yz so that |y| = k. Let mt denote the probability
that t is the first index so that both t and t + 1 are Catalan slots in w, with m0 = 0, and consider the probability
generating function {mt} ←→ M(Z) =
∑∞
t=0mtZ
t. Controlling the decay of the coefficientsmt suffices to give a
bound on Pr[B], i.e., the probability that y does not contain two consecutive Catalan slots, because this probability
is at most 1 −∑k−1t=0 mt = ∑∞t=kmt. To this end, we develop a closed-form expression for a related probability
generating function Mˆ(Z) =
∑
t mˆtZ
t which stochastically dominates M(Z). Recall that this means that for any
k,
∑
t≥kmk ≤
∑
t≥k mˆk. Finally, bound the laer sum by using the analytic properties of Mˆ(Z).
Recall the “first ascent” and “first descent” generating functions A(Z) and D(Z) from the proof of Bound 1. We
wish to devise the generating function for the first occurrence of a le-Catalan slot immediately followed by a right-
Catalan slot. To that end, note that D(Z) is the generating function for the first le-Catalan slot. e generating
function for the first right-Catalan slot can be devised as follows. Consider the walk S starting at the origin. With
probability q(1− p/q) = ǫ, the walk will immediately descend a step and never return to the origin. But this means
S1 ≤ St, t ≥ 2 and hence the first slot is a right-Catalan slot and we are done. Otherwise, i.e., with probability
1 − ǫ, the walk makes a (guaranteed) return to the origin in future. In this case, we will have to restart our search
for the next consecutive Catalan slots but, before that, we will have to ensure that we are in a “safe position.” In
particular, we can safely restart our search if Specifically, if the current position (i.e., level) of the walk is at its
historical minimum, we can restart our search by applying D(Z) to find the next le-Catalan slot. us an “epoch”
begins with a guaranteed return and ends when the walk descends to a new level for the first time. Let E(Z) be the
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generating function of an epoch. us we can write
M(Z) = D(Z) · {ǫ+ (1 − ǫ)E(Z)M(Z)}
=
ǫD(Z)
1− (1− ǫ)E(Z) . (10)
An epoch can have two shapes. If an epoch starts with an up-step (i.e., an “up” shape), it is easy to see that the
epoch ends as soon as the walk returns to the origin from above and, importantly, that the walk will (eventually)
return to the origin with probability one. However, if the epoch starts with a down-step (i.e., a “down” shape), we
have to “remember” the lowest level ℓ touched by the walk in its way to its (sure) ascent to the origin and then
descend ℓ levels to end the epoch. In particular, we have to ensure that we return to the origin with probability one.
A generating function of a stopping time of a randomwalk is ill suited to “remember” its historicalminimum/maximum.
However, it can remember the length of the walk for free. us, instead of working directly with E(Z), we work with
a generating function Eˆ(Z) which is identical to E(Z) for the up shape but differs in the down shape. Specifically,
in the down shape, the walk represented by Eˆ(Z) descends as many levels as the number of steps it took to return
to the origin. Clearly, E  Eˆ where
Eˆ(Z) , pZD(Z) + qZA(ZD(Z))/A(1) .
Here, the first term denotes the “return to origin from above” shape. An individual term inA(ZD(Z)) =
∑
t atZ
t
D(Z)t
has the interpretation “if the first ascent took t steps then follow it by descending t levels.” Since A(Z) is not a prob-
ability generating function, we have to normalize it by A(1) to denote that the ascent happens with certainty. is
implies,
M(Z)  Mˆ(Z) , ǫD(Z)
1− (1− ǫ)Eˆ(Z)
It remains to establish a bound on the radius of convergence of Mˆ. A sufficient condition for the convergence
of Mˆ(z) for some z ∈ R is that all generating functions appearing in the definition of Mˆ converge at z and that
(1 − ǫ)Eˆ(Z) 6= 1.
By retracing our footsteps as in the proof of Bound 1, we can see that D(z),A(z), and A(zD(z)) converge when
|z| satisfies (5). Moreover, since D(Z) is a probability generating function, it follows that Eˆ(Z) is stochastically
dominated by pZD(Z) + qZA(ZD(Z))/A(1) · D(Z). erefore, when Eˆ(z) converges for some z, it satisfies
Eˆ(z) ≤ pzD(z) + (q/p)(qzD(z))A(zD(z))
< 1/2 + (q/p)/2
since A(1) = p/q, pzD(z) < 1/2, and qxA(x) < 1/2 for any z, x so that A(x) and D(z) converge, respectively.
erefore, (1 − ǫ)Eˆ(z) = 2pEˆ(z) < p + q = 1. It follows that Mˆ(z) converges for |z| < 1 + ǫ3/2 + O(ǫ4) ≤
exp(ǫ3/2 +O(ǫ4)). Recall that if the radius of convergence of Mˆ is exp(δ) then Pr[B] is O(1) · e−δk. We conclude
that
Pr
w
[B] ≤ O(1) · e−ǫ3(1+O(ǫ))k/2 . (11)
Case 2: x is non-empty. is part of the proof is the same as the |x| ≥ 1 case in the proof of Bound 1. e only
difference is that Cˆ(Z) and C˜(Z) would be replaced by Mˆ(Z) and M˜(Z), respectively, where
M˜(Z) 
∞∑
h=0
X∞(h)D(Z)hMˆ(Z) .
We conclude that the bound in (11) holds when |x| ≥ 0.
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6 An optimal online adversary against slot settlement
In this section, we introduce additional elements of the fork framework from Blum et al. [3], most notably the
notions of “reach” and “relative margin.” We show that relative margin is just as expressive as the Catalan slots for
characterizing slot selement. Next, we prove a recurrence relation for relative margin; it can be used to compute the
probability that a given slot is k-seled, when the symbols of the characteristic string are i.i.d . Finally, we present
an adversary who, given a characteristic string one symbol at a time, optimally aacks the selement of all slots at
once.
6.1 Closed forks, reach, and extensions
Definition 12 (Closed fork). A fork F is closed if every leaf is honest. For convenience, we say the trivial fork is closed.
Closed forks have two nice properties that make them especially useful in reasoning about the view of honest
parties. First, all honest observers will select a unique longest tine from this fork (since all longest tines in a closed
fork are honest, honest parties are aware of all previous honest blocks, they observe the longest chain rule, and
they employ the same consistent tie-breaking rule). Second, closed forks intuitively capture decision points for the
adversary. e adversary can potentially show many tines to many honest parties, but once an honest node has been
placed on top of a tine, any adversarial blocks beneath it are part of the public record and are visible to all honest
parties. For these reasons, we will oen find it easier to reason about closed forks than arbitrary forks.
e next few definitions are the start of a general toolkit for reasoning about an adversary’s capacity to build
highly diverging paths in forks, based on the underlying characteristic string.
Definition 13 (Gap, reserve, and reach). For a closed fork F ⊢ w and its unique longest tine tˆ, we define the gap of
a tine t to be gap(t) = length(tˆ) − length(t). Furthermore, we define the reserve of t, denoted reserve(t), to be the
number of adversarial indices in w that appear aer the terminating vertex of t. More precisely, if v is the last vertex of
t, then
reserve(t) = |{ i | wi = 1 and i > ℓ(v)}| .
ese quantities together define the reach of a tine: reach(t) = reserve(t)− gap(t).
e notion of reach can be intuitively understood as a measure of the resources available to our adversary in the
selement game. Reserve tracks the number of slots in which the adversary has the right to issue new blocks. When
reserve exceeds gap (or equivalently, when reach is nonnegative), such a tine could be extended—using a sequence
of dishonest blocks—until it is as long as the longest tine. Such a tine could be offered to an honest player who would
prefer it over, e.g., the current longest tine in the fork. In contrast, a tine with negative reach is too far behind to be
directly useful to the adversary at that time.
Definition 14 (Maximum reach). For a closed fork F ⊢ w, we define ρ(F ) to be the largest reach aained by any tine
of F , i.e.,
ρ(F ) = max
t
reach(t) .
Note that ρ(F ) is never negative (as the longest tine of any fork always has reach at least 0). We overload this notation
to denote the maximum reach over all forks for a given characteristic string:
ρ(w) = max
F⊢w
F closed
[
max
t
reach(t)
]
.
Reach of vertices is always non-increasing as we move down a tine. at is, ifB1, B2, . . . are vertices on the same
tine in the root-to-leaf order, then reach(Bi) ≤ reach(Bi+1). e inequality is strict ifBi+1 is honest. Consequently,
the reach of an adversarial tine is no more than the reach of the last honest vertex in that tine. In any fork, the reach
of a maximum-length tine is always non-negative. Hence, an honest tine with the maximum length over all honest
tines will always have a non-negative reach. anks to the monotonicity of the honest-depth function d(·), if there
are multiple honest tines having the (same) maximum length among all honest tines, they must have the same label.
erefore, if h is the last honest slot in w and t a maximum-length honest tine with label h, then reach(t) ≥ 0.
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Non-negative reach, A-heaviness, and viable adversarial extensions. Let w ∈ {h, H, A}T , s ∈ [T + 1], and
F ⊢ w1 . . . ws−1 an arbitrary fork. Let B ∈ F be an honest vertex and t a maximum-length tine in F . Consider the
following statements:
(a) B has an adversarial extension viable at the onset of slot s.
(b) reachF (B) is non-negative.
(c) e interval I = [ℓ(B) + 1, s− 1] is A-heavy.
(d) length(t) = #h(I) + #H(I) + length(B).
Fact 4. (a) =⇒ (b) =⇒ (c). In addition, if we assume (d), then (c) =⇒ (b) =⇒ (a).
Fact 4 can be seen as a refinement of Fact 1 when F is a closed fork.
Proof.
(a) implies (b). An adversarial extension of B contains only adversarial vertices from I . If this extension is viable
at the onset of slot s, #A(I) must be at least gapF (B). Since reserveF (B) = #A(I), we have reachF (B) =
reserveF (B)− gapF (B) ≥ 0.
(b) implies (c). By assumption, reachF (B) = reserveF (B) − gapF (B) ≥ 0. t contains at least #h(I) + #H(I)
vertices from the interval I ; hence, gapF (B) ≥ #h(I) + #H(I). Since reserveF (B) = #A(I), it follows that
#A(I) ≥ #h(I) + #H(I).
(d) and (c) implies (b). Since I is A-heavy, reserveF (B) = #A(I) ≥ #h(I) + #H(I). However, since (d) holds,
the laer quantity equals length(t) − length(B) = gapF (B). It follows that reachF (B) = reserveF (B) −
gapF (B) ≥ 0.
(d) and (b) implies (a). I contains at least gapF (B) adversarial slots. We can use these slots augment B into an
adversarial tine t′ of length at least length(t). us t′ will be viable at the onset of slot s.
Observe that for any characteristic string x, one can extend (i.e., augment) a closed fork prefix F ⊢ x into a
larger closed fork F ′ ⊢ x0 so that F ⊑ F ′. A conservative extension is a minimal extension in that it consumes the
least amount of reserve (cf. Definition 13), leaving the remaining reserve to be used in future. Extensions and, in
particular, conservative extensions play a critical role in the exposition that follows.
Definition 15 (Extensions). Let w ∈ {h, H, A}∗ be a characteristic string and F a closed fork for w. Let F ′ be a
closed fork for wb, b ∈ {h, H} so that F ⊑ F ′. We say that F ′ is an extension of F if every honest vertex in F ′ either
belongs to F or has label |w| + 1. Let σ ∈ F ′ be an honest vertex with ℓ(σ) = |w| + 1 and let s be the longest honest
prefix of σ. (Necessarily, s ∈ F .) We say that σ is an extension of s. e new tine σ is a conservative extension if
height(F ′) = height(F ) + 1.
Since F ′ is closed, all longest tines in F ′ are honest and they have label |w| + 1. Let tˆ be the unique longest
honest tine in F ′ under the consistent longest-chain selection rule in Axiom A0′. Now consider a tine σ ∈ S. Since
σ is honest, it follows that length(σ) ≥ 1+height(F ) = 1+ length(s)+gapF (s) where s ∈ F is the longest honst
prefix of σ. e root-to-leaf path in F ′ that ends at σ contains at least gapF (s) adversarial vertices u ∈ F ′ so that
ℓ(u) ∈ [ℓ(s) + 1, |w|] and u 6∈ F . If σ is a conservative extension, the number of such vertices is exactly gapF (s).
Fact 5 (Extensions and reach). Let b ∈ {h, H}. Let F ⊢ w and F ′ ⊢ wb be closed forks so that F ⊑ F ′ and F ′ is
obtained from F via one or more extensions σ ∈ F ′, ℓ(σ) = |w|+1. en reachF ′(t) ≤ reachF (t)− 1 for every t ∈ F .
If all these extensions are conservative, then reachF ′(t) = reachF (t)− 1 for every t ∈ F . Furthermore, a conservative
extension σ satisfies reachF ′(σ) = 0.
e above fact follows from the claims below.
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Claim 1. Let b ∈ {h, H}. Consider a closed fork F ⊢ w and some closed fork F ′ ⊢ wb such that F ⊑ F ′. If t ∈ F then
reachF ′(t) ≤ reachF (t)− 1. e inequality becomes and equality if F ′ is obtained via conservative extensions from F .
Proof. We know that reachF ′(t) = reserveF ′(t)− gapF ′(t). From F to F ′, the length of the longest tine increases
by at least one, and the length of t does not change. It follows that gapF ′(t) ≥ gapF (t)+ 1. e inequality becomes
an equality if F ′ is obtained from F via only conservative extensions. e reserve of t does not change, because
there are no new As in the characteristic string. erefore, reachF ′(t) = reserveF ′(t) − gapF ′(t) ≤ reserveF (t)−
gapF (t)− 1 = reachF (t)− 1.
Claim 2. Conservative extensions have reach zero.
Proof. Let b ∈ {h, H}. Consider closed forks F ⊢ w,F ′ ⊢ wb such that F ⊑ F ′. Let t ∈ F ′ be a conservative
extension. is means t is honest, ℓ(t) = |w|+1, and t is a longest tine inF ′. e last statement implies gapF ′(t) = 0.
Since reserveF ′(t) = 0, it follows that reachF ′(t) = reserveF ′(t)− gapF ′(t) = 0.
6.2 Relative margin
Definition 16 (e ∼x relations). For two tines t1 and t2 of a fork F , we write t1 ∼ t2 when t1 and t2 share an
edge; otherwise we write t1 ≁ t2. We generalize this equivalence relation to reflect whether tines share an edge over a
particular suffix of w: for w = xy we define t1 ∼x t2 if t1 and t2 share an edge that terminates at some node labeled
with an index in y; otherwise, we write t1 ≁x t2 (observe that in this case the paths share no vertex labeled by a slot
associated with y). We sometimes call such pairs of tines disjoint (or, if t1 ≁x t2 for a string w = xy, disjoint over y).
Note that ∼ and ∼ε are the same relation.
Definition 17 (Margin). e margin of a fork F ⊢ w, denoted µ(F ), is defined as
µ(F ) = max
t1≁t2
(
min{reach(t1), reach(t2)}
)
, (12)
where this maximum is extended over all pairs of disjoint tines of F ; thus margin reflects the “second best” reach obtained
over all disjoint tines. In order to study splits in the chain over particular portions of a string, we generalize this to define
a “relative” notion of margin: If w = xy for two strings x and y and, as above, F ⊢ w, we define
µx(F ) = max
t1≁xt2
(
min{reach(t1), reach(t2)}
)
.
Note that µε(F ) = µ(F ).
For convenience, we once again overload this notation to denote the margin of a string. µ(w) refers to the maximum
value of µ(F ) over all possible closed forks F for a characteristic string w:
µ(w) = max
F⊢w,
F closed
µ(F ) .
Likewise, if w = xy for two strings x and y we define
µx(y) = max
F⊢w,
F closed
µx(F ) .
Note that, at least informally, disjoint tines with large reach are of natural interest to an adversary who wants
to build an x-balanced fork, since such a fork contains two (partially disjoint) long tines. It is easy to see that if
w = xx′y and µxx′(y) is negative then µx(x′y) is negative as well.
e theorem below shows how to recursively compute µx(y) for a given decomposition w = xy.
eorem 5. Let ε be the empty string and b ∈ {h, H}. en ρ(ε) = 0 and, for all nonempty strings w ∈ {h, H, A}∗
ρ(wA) = ρ(w) + 1 , and ρ(wb) =
{
0 if ρ(w) = 0,
ρ(w) − 1 otherwise. (13)
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Furthermore, for any strings x, y ∈ {h, H, A}*, µx(ε) = ρ(x),
µx(yA) = µx(y) + 1 , and µx(yb) =


0 if ρ(xy) > µx(y) = 0 ,
0 if ρ(xy) = µx(y) = 0 and b = H ,
µx(y)− 1 otherwise.
(14)
e proof ofeorem 5 is given in Section 7. Letw be a characteristic string and letm, k ∈ N so thatm+k ≤ |w|.
Let x ≺ w, |x| = m− 1 and xy  w, |xy| ≥ m+ k. If the symbols in w are independent and identically distributed,
the recursive formulation in (14) implies an algorithm — which takes time and space O(|w|3) — for computing the
probability that µx(y) ≥ 0. But this is exactly the probability that slot m is not k-seled, according to (1) and
Lemma 1 below. In Section 6.6, we describe this algorithm in more detail and compile some explicit values for this
probability.
6.3 Balanced forks, settlement violations, and relative margin
A natural structure we can use to reason about selement times (see Definition 3) is that of a “balanced fork.”
Definition 18 (Balanced fork). A fork F is balanced if it contains a pair of tines t1 and t2 for which t1 ≁ t2 and
length(t1) = length(t2) = height(F ). We define a relative notion of balance as follows: a fork F ⊢ xy is x-balanced
if it contains a pair of tines t1 and t2 for which t1 6∼x t2 and length(t1) = length(t2) = height(F ).
us, balanced forks contain two completely disjoint, maximum-length tines, while x-balanced forks contain
two maximum-length tines that may share edges in x but must be disjoint over the rest of the string. See Figures 2
and 3 for examples of balanced forks.
w = h
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Figure 2: A balanced fork
w = h
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h
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Figure 3: An x-balanced fork, where x = hh
A fundamental question arising in typical blockchain seings is how to determine selement time, the delay aer
which the contents of a particular block of a blockchain can be considered stable. e existence of a balanced fork
is a precise indicator for “selement violations” in this sense. Specifically, consider a characteristic string xy and
a transaction appearing in a block associated with the first slot of y (that is, slot |x| + 1). One clear violation of
selement at this point of the execution is the existence of two chains—each of maximum length—which diverge
prior to y; in particular, this indicates that there is an x-balanced fork F for xy. Let us record this observation below.3
Observation 2. Let s, k ∈ N be given and letw be a characteristic string. Slot s is not k-seled for the characteristic
string w if there exist a decomposition w = xyz, where |x| = s− 1 and |y| ≥ k + 1, and an x-balanced fork for xy.
In particular, to provide a rigorous k-slot selement guarantee—which is to say that the transaction can be
considered seled once k slots have gone by—it suffices to show that with overwhelming probability in choice of
the characteristic string determined by the leader election process (of a full execution of the protocol), no such forks
are possible. Specifically, if the protocol runs for a total of T time steps yielding the characteristics string w = xy
(where w ∈ {0, 1}T and the transaction of interest appears in slot |x| + 1 as above) then it suffices to ensure that
3 A balanced fork in [3] had the property that at least one maximum-length tine was adversarial. But this is not true in our seing since we
allow multiply honest slots.
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there is no x-balanced fork for xyˆ, where yˆ is an arbitrary prefix of y of length at least k + 1. Note that for systems
adopting the longest chain rule, this condition must necessarily involve the entire future dynamics of the blockchain.
We remark that our analysis below will in fact let us take T =∞.
Let w be a characteristic string. Writing w = xy, consider any tine-pair (tx, tρ) in a fork F ⊢ w so that
reachF (tρ) = ρ(F ) and tx is y-disjoint with tρ. Observe that if µx(y) < 0 then reachF (tx) < 0.
Fact 6. Let xy ∈ {h, H, A}∗ be a characteristic string. ere is no x-balanced fork for xy if and only if µx(y) < 0.
Proof sketch. If a fork F ⊢ xy satisfies µx(F ) ≥ 0, it contains two y-disjoint tines t1, t2, each with a non-negative
reach, so that min(reach(t1), reach(t2)) = µx(F ). As reserve(ti) ≥ gap(ti) for i ∈ {1, 2}, we can extend these
tines using only new adversarial vertices so that both these extensions have the maximum length in the augmented
fork. us the augmented fork is x-balanced.
On the other hand, if a fork F ⊢ xy is x-balanced, there must be two y-disjoint maximum-length tines t1, t2 ∈ F .
As the gap of a maximum-length tine is zero, we must have reach(ti) = reserve(ti) ≥ 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}. It follows
that µx(y) ≥ µx(F ) ≥ mini reach(ti) ≥ 0.
6.4 Relative margin to characterize the UVP
Let w be a characteristic string. Recall that in eorem 3, we showed that whether a slot has the UVP in w — a
structural property of the forks for w — is characterized by the “Catalan-ness” of the said slot. Below, we show that
relative margin has the same expressive power as the Catalan slots in terms of characterizing the UVP.
Lemma 1. Let T ∈ N, w ∈ {h, H, A}T , and s ∈ [T ] so that ws = h. Let x = w1 . . . ws−1. Slot s has the UVP in w if
and only if for every prefix xy  w, µx(y) < 0.
Proof.
e⇐= direction. Suppose that for every prefix xy  w where |y| ≥ 1, we have µx(y) < 0. We wish to show that
s has the UVP in w.
Let F be any fork for xy and let t ∈ F, ℓ(t) ≤ s− 1 be an honest tine. Since it is disjoint with any tine in F
over the suffix y, reach(t) < 0 and, by Fact 4, t does not have an adversarial extension t′ ∈ F, t ≺ t′ that is
viable at the onset of slot |xy|+1. erefore, if a tine in F is viable at the onset of slot |xy|+1, it must contain
an honest vertex with label at least s. However, since an honest vertex builds only on top of a viable tine, it
follows that any viable tine must contain the unique honest vertex with label s.
e =⇒ direction. Suppose s has the UVP in w. Let k ∈ [s, T ] be an integer and write w = xyz with |xy| = k.
(Note that y1 = ws.) We wish to show that µx(y) < 0.
LetF be any fork for xy. Since slot s belongs to y, F cannot contain two tines such that (i) both tines are viable
at the onset of slot |xy|+1 and, at the same time, (ii) disjoint over the length of y since they must contain the
unique vertex with label s. In particular, F cannot be x-balanced. As F was an arbitrary fork for xy, no fork
for xy can be x-balanced for our choice of k. We use Fact 6 to conclude that µx(y) must be negative.
6.5 An optimal online adversary against slot settlement
Let w be a characteristic string. For a fixed decomposition w = xy, there is an adversary4 who builds a fork F ⊢ xy
so that the µx(F ) is at least as large as the right-hand side of (14). However, in light of Lemma 1, if an adversary
wants to violate the selement of all possible slots of w at once, he needs to produce a fork F for w so that µx(F ) ≥ 0
4 Specifically, let w′ = xyb where b ∈ {h, H, A}. is strategy recursively builds a closed fork F ⊢ xy. en, upon encountering b, it
augments F by making zero, one, or two conservative extensions, as follows: If b = A, it does nothing. If b = h, it extends a zero-reach tine if
possible; otherwise,it extends a maximum-reach tine. If b = H, it extends a pair of tines that witness µx(F ). By following the arguments in [4],
one can show that if µx(F ) = µx(y) then µx(F ′) is at least as large as the right-hand side in (14).
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for every prefix x  w. In Figure 4, we describe a strategy A∗ which does even beer: it produces a fork F so that
µx(F ) = µx(y) for every prefix x  w.
A∗ builds a fork for w = w1 . . . wn+1 in an online fashion, i.e., it scans w once, from le to right, maintains a
fork Fn aer scanning the first n symbols, and augments Fn by conservatively extending zero-reach tine(s) using
label n+ 1. Specifically, if wn+1 = A, A∗ does nothing. If wn+1 = h, it (obviously) makes a single extension. Now
suppose wn+1 = H. It still makes a single extension if either Fn contains exactly one zero-reach tine or Fn’s reach is
positive. Otherwise, if ρ(Fn) = 0 and there are at least two zero-reach tines in Fn,A∗ extends two zero-reach tines
that diverge earliest in Fn.
e strategyA∗
Let n be a non-negative integer, w ∈ {h, H, A}n, and wn+1 ∈ {h, H, A}. If n = 0, set F0 ⊢ ε as the trivial
fork comprising a single vertex. Otherwise, let Fn be the closed fork built recursively byA∗ for the string
w. If wn+1 = A, output Fn (as a fork for wwn+1). Otherwise, let Z and R be the set of zero-reach tines
and maximum-reach tines in Fn, respectively.
1. Identify a set S as follows: If |Z| = 1 then set S = Z . Otherwise, let r1 ∈ R, z1 ∈ Z be two tines
so that ℓ(r1 ∩ z1) = min{ℓ(r ∩ z) : r ∈ R, z ∈ Z} and set
S =
{
{z1} if wn+1 = h or ρ(Fn) ≥ 1 ,
{z1, r1} otherwise .
2. Conservatively extend each tine in S using label n+1. Let Fn+1 ⊢ wwn+1 be the new closed fork.
Output Fn+1.
Figure 4: Optimal online adversary A∗
Definition 19 (Canonical fork). A canonical fork for w ∈ {h, H, A}∗ is a closed fork F ⊢ w so that ρ(F ) = ρ(w) and,
for all prefixes x ≺ w, µx(F ) = µx(y). If |w| = 0, F is the unique fork with a single (honest) vertex and no edge.
It is not obvious whether a canonical fork always exists or whether it can be found algorithmically. e theorem
below gives us the assurance:
eorem 6. Let w ∈ {h, H, A}∗. e strategy A∗ in Figure 4 outputs a canonical fork for w.
at is, for every characteristic string w there is a fork F ⊢ w so that for every prefix x  w, µx(F ) = µx(y).
Note that if one’s objective is to create a fork which contains many early-diverging tine-pairs (that witness large
relative margins), a canonical fork is the best one can hope for. is is whyA∗ is called an optimal online adversary.
e proof of eorem 6 is given in Section 7.
6.6 An algorithm to compute exact settlement probabilities
Letm, k ∈ N, ǫ ∈ (0, 1], and ph ∈ (0, (1+ǫ)/2]. LetT = m+k, α = (1−ǫ)/2, and pH = 1−α−ph. Letw ∈ {h, H, A}T
such that the symbols wi, i ∈ [T ] are i.i.d. with Pr[wi = A] = α,Pr[wi = h] = ph, and Pr[wi = H] = pH. Write w
as w = xy where |x| = m, |y| = k. e recursive definition of relative margin (cf. eorem 5) implies an algorithm
for computing the probability Pr[µx(y) ≥ 0] in O(T 3) time and space.
In typical circumstances, however, it is more interesting to establish an explicit upper bound on Pr[µx(y) ≥
0] where |x| → ∞; this corresponds to the case where the distribution of the initial reach ρ(x) is the dominant
distribution X∞ in (9). Due to dominance, X∞(m) serves as an upper bound on ρ(x) for any finite m = |x|. For
this purpose, one can implicitly maintain a sequence of matricesMt, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , k such thatM0(r, r) = X∞(r)
for all 0 ≤ r ≤ 2k and the invariant
Mt(r, s) = Pr
y:|y|=t
[ρ(xy) = r and µx(y) = s]
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Table 1: Exact probabilities of k-selement violations where the symbols h, H, A are independent and identically
distributed as Pr[A] = α ∈ (0, 0.5) and Pr[H] = 1− α− Pr[h].
Pr[h]
1− α k
α
0.01 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.49
1.0
100 5.70E-054 5.10E-018 2.28E-008 8.00E-004 1.37E-001 9.05E-001
200 1.64E-106 9.82E-035 1.61E-015 1.60E-006 3.36E-002 8.73E-001
300 4.70E-159 1.89E-051 1.14E-022 3.25E-009 8.52E-003 8.50E-001
400 1.35E-211 3.64E-068 8.02E-030 6.59E-012 2.18E-003 8.29E-001
500 1.02E-264 3.90E-085 4.00E-037 1.10E-014 5.16E-004 8.05E-001
0.9
100 9.75E-052 1.24E-017 3.24E-008 9.27E-004 1.44E-001 9.08E-001
200 3.04E-102 4.95E-034 2.96E-015 2.03E-006 3.60E-002 8.77E-001
300 9.46E-153 1.98E-050 2.71E-022 4.50E-009 9.30E-003 8.53E-001
400 2.95E-203 7.91E-067 2.48E-029 9.96E-012 2.43E-003 8.33E-001
500 1.83E-254 1.63E-083 1.54E-036 1.78E-014 5.80E-004 8.08E-001
0.8
100 6.16E-048 4.13E-017 5.10E-008 1.11E-003 1.53E-001 9.11E-001
200 7.58E-095 4.61E-033 6.58E-015 2.73E-006 3.91E-002 8.81E-001
300 9.32E-142 5.14E-049 8.48E-022 6.78E-009 1.04E-002 8.57E-001
400 1.15E-188 5.74E-065 1.09E-028 1.68E-011 2.77E-003 8.38E-001
500 1.94E-236 3.02E-081 9.16E-036 3.28E-014 6.70E-004 8.12E-001
0.5
100 4.80E-028 6.53E-014 6.21E-007 2.80E-003 1.99E-001 9.26E-001
200 2.46E-055 6.31E-027 6.40E-013 1.31E-005 5.86E-002 8.98E-001
300 1.26E-082 6.10E-040 6.60E-019 6.19E-008 1.76E-002 8.77E-001
400 6.46E-110 5.90E-053 6.81E-025 2.92E-010 5.33E-003 8.59E-001
500 1.28E-138 1.75E-066 3.65E-031 9.61E-013 1.39E-003 8.31E-001
0.25
100 1.22E-012 3.13E-008 8.94E-005 1.65E-002 3.17E-001 9.48E-001
200 1.51E-024 1.06E-015 9.36E-009 3.36E-004 1.25E-001 9.27E-001
300 1.86E-036 3.62E-023 9.80E-013 6.86E-006 4.94E-002 9.10E-001
400 2.30E-048 1.23E-030 1.03E-016 1.40E-007 1.96E-002 8.96E-001
500 5.06E-062 7.72E-039 4.06E-021 1.66E-009 6.20E-003 8.65E-001
0.01
100 3.77E-001 4.91E-001 6.38E-001 7.95E-001 9.31E-001 9.97E-001
200 1.42E-001 2.41E-001 4.08E-001 6.34E-001 8.72E-001 9.95E-001
300 5.37E-002 1.18E-001 2.61E-001 5.06E-001 8.17E-001 9.94E-001
400 2.03E-002 5.81E-002 1.67E-001 4.04E-001 7.66E-001 9.92E-001
500 7.89E-005 3.23E-003 2.71E-002 1.40E-001 4.83E-001 9.54E-001
is satisfied for every integer t ∈ [1, k], r ∈ [0, 2k], and s ∈ [−2k, 2k]. Here, M(i, j) denotes the entry at the ith
row and jth column of a matrix M . Observe that Mt(r, s) can be computed solely from the relevant neighboring
cells of Mt−1, that is, from the valuesMt−1(r ± 1, s± 1). Of course, only the transitions approved by (14) should
be considered.
Finally, one can compute Pr[µx(y) ≥ 0] by summingMk(r, s) for r, s ≥ 0. is is precisely the probability that,
given a characteristic string xy where |x| → ∞, the slot |x|+1 incurs a |y|-selement violation. Table 1 (on page 26)
contains these probabilities for various values of α, |y|, and ph.
AC++ implementation of the above algorithm is publicly available at hps://github.com/saad0105050/multihonest-code[11].
7 Proofs of eorem 5 and eorem 6
e proof of eorem 5 is presented in two parts. Let w ∈ {h, H, A}∗. First, for a given decomposition w = xy, we
prove an upper bound on µx(y). Next, considering the fork F ⊢ w built by the strategy Adversary∗ (see Figure 4),
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we show that for every decomposition w = xy, µx(F ) is at least as large as the upper bound proven in the first part;
thus F is canonical.
As a warm-up, we start with the following claim.
Claim 3. ρ(ε) = 0. For any x, y ∈ {h, H, A}∗, µx(ε) = ρ(x), ρ(xyA) = ρ(xy) + 1, and µx(yA) = µx(y) + 1.
Proof. e only possible fork for the empty string ε contains a single honest vertex with reserve and gap both zero;
hence ρ(ε) = 0.
Let F be a closed fork for the characteristic string xy. Let tρ, tx ∈ F be the two tines that witness µx(F ), i.e.,
reach(tρ) = ρ(F ), reachF (tx) = µx(F ), and tρ, tx are disjoint over y.
In the base case, where y = ε, observe that any two tines of F are disjoint over y. Moreover, a single tine t ∈ F
is disjoint with itself over the empty suffix ε. erefore, the relative margin µx(ε) must be at least ρ(x). As µx(F )
can be no more than ρ(x), it follows that µx(ε) = ρ(x).
Now consider a pair of closed forks F ⊢ xy and F ′ ⊢ xyA such that F ⊑ F ′ and x, y ∈ {h, H, A}∗. We must
have F ′ = F since F ′ is closed. In addition, for any tine t ∈ F , reachF ′(t) = reachF (t) + 1 since the reserve
has increased by one but the gap is unchanged (as no new tine is added). erefore, ρ(xyA) = ρ(xy) + 1 and
µx(yA) = µx(y) + 1.
7.1 An upper bound on relative margin
Proposition 1. Let w, x, y ∈ {h, H, A}∗ and b ∈ {h, H}, en
ρ(xyb) ≤
{
0 if ρ(xy) = 0 ,
ρ(xy)− 1 otherwise. (15)
Furthermore,
µx(yb) ≤


0 if ρ(xy) > µx(y) = 0 ,
0 if ρ(xy) = µx(y) = 0 and b = H ,
µx(y)− 1 otherwise.
(16)
Proof. Suppose F ′ ⊢ xyb is a closed fork such that ρ(xyb) = ρ(F ′) and µx(yb) = µx(F ′). Let tρ, tx ∈ F ′ be a pair
of y-disjoint tines such that reachF ′(tρ) = ρ(F
′) and reachF ′(tx) = µx(F ′). (If there are multiple candidates for
tρ or tx, select the one with the smallest ≤π rank.) Let F ⊢ xy be the unique closed fork such that F ⊑ F ′. Note
that while F ′ is obtained from one or more extensions of F -tines, these extensions are not necessarily conservative.
Recall that reachF ′(t) ≤ 0 for any tine t ∈ F ′, ℓ(t) = |xy|+ 1.
Proving (15). Let A be the set of all F ′-tines with label |xy| + 1. Let σ ∈ A be the first tine in the ≤π ordering
so that reach(σ) = maxt∈A{reachF ′(t)}. By Fact 5, reachF ′(σ) ≤ 0 and, in addition, for any t ∈ F , reachF ′(t) ≤
reachF (t)− 1. Let tˆ be the maximum-reach tine in F with the smallest ≤π rank.
If ρ(F ) = 0 then reachF ′(t) < 0 for all t ∈ F . Hence tρ = σ and, consequently, ρ(xyb) ≤ 0. If ρ(F ) ≥ 2 then
tρ ∈ F and, therefore, ρ(xyb) = reachF ′(tρ) ≤ ρ(F ) − 1 ≤ ρ(xy) − 1. If ρ(F ) = 1 and tρ ∈ F then, as before,
ρ(xyb) = reachF ′(tˆ) = reachF (tˆ) − 1 = ρ(F ) − 1 ≤ ρ(xy) − 1. If ρ(F ) = 1 and tρ 6∈ F then, as we have seen
before, ρ(xyb) = reachF ′(σ) ≤ 0 = ρ(F )− 1 ≤ ρ(xy)− 1. us we have proved (15).
Proving (16). If ℓ(tρ) = |xy| + 1 then we are done: by our preceding argument, reachF ′(tρ) ≤ 0. On the other
hand, Note that tρ 6∈ F since, by Fact 5, reach of any F tine can only decrease tρ must have been an extension of a
maximum-reach F -tine.
Case 1: ρ(xy) > 0 and µx(y) = 0. We wish to show that µx(yb) ≤ 0. Suppose (toward a contradiction) that
µx(yb) > 0. en neither tρ nor tx is a conservative extension because, as we proved in Claim 2, conservative
extensions have reach zero. is means that tρ and tx existed in F , and their F -reach was strictly greater than
their F ′-reach (by Claim 1). Because tρ and tx are disjoint over y0, they must also be disjoint over y; therefore,
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µx(F ) must be at least min(reachF (tρ), reachF (tx)). It follows that 0 = µx(y) ≥ min(reachF (tρ), reachF (tx)) >
min(reachF ′(tρ), reachF ′(tx)) = µx(F
′) = µx(yb). e last term is strictly positive by assumption and hence, a
contradiction ensues.
Case 2: ρ(xy) = 0. We wish to show that (i) µx(yb) ≤ 0 if b = H and µx(y) = 0, and (ii) µx(yb) ≤ µx(y) − 1
otherwise. First, we claim that tρ must arise from an extension. Suppose, toward a contradiction, that tρ is not an
extension, i.e., tρ ∈ F . e fact that tρ achieves the maximum reach in F ′ implies that tρ has a non-negative reach
since the longest honest tine always achieves reach zero. Furthermore, Claim 1 states that all F -tines see their reach
decrease. erefore, tρ ∈ F must have had a strictly positive reach. But this contradicts the central assumption of
the case, i.e., that ρ(xy) = 0. erefore, we conclude that tρ ∈ F ′ \ F .
Let s ∈ F be the tine-prefix of tρ ∈ F ′ so that tρ is an extension of s. Observe that reachF (s) must be
non-negative since otherwise, s could not have been extended. In fact, our assumption ρ(xy) = 0 implies that
reachF (s) = 0. In addition, since tx and tρ are disjoint over yb, so are tx and s.
If b = h, tρ is the only extension in F
′ and hence tx must be in F . Consequently, min(reachF (s), reachF (tx)) ≤
µx(y). Because reachF (s) = 0 and reachF (tx) ≤ ρ(xy) = 0, it follows that reachF (tx) ≤ µx(y). Finally,
since tx ∈ F , Claim 1 tells us that reachF ′(tx) < reachF (tx). Taken together, these two inequalities show
that µx(yb) = reachF ′(tx) < reachF (tx) ≤ µx(y). e last inequality follows since s and tx are disjoint over
y and reachF (s) = 0 = ρ(xy). We conclude that µx(yb) ≤ µx(y)− 1.
If b = H and µx(y) < 0, we claim that tx ∈ F . To see why, note that as tx is yb-disjoint with tρ, it must extend
some F -tine t that is y-disjoint with tρ. However, as µx(y) < 0, tmust have negative reach and hence cannot
be extended into tx; this is a contradiction. erefore, tx ∈ F and we can apply the argument in the “b = h”
case above to conclude that µx(yb) ≤ µx(y)− 1.
If b = H and µx(y) = 0, then there are two alternatives depending on whether tx is an extension. If tx is not an
extension, we can apply the argument in the “b = h” case above and conclude that µx(yb) ≤ µx(y)− 1 = −1.
On the other hand, if tx 6∈ F , both tx and tρ are extensions and, by Fact 5,max(reachF ′(tx), reachF ′(tρ)) ≤ 0.
In addition, Fact 5 states that for all t ∈ F , reachF ′(t) < reachF (t) ≤ ρ(xy) = 0. We conclude that
µx(yb) ≤ 0.
Case 3: ρ(xy) > 0 andµx(y) 6= 0. Wewish to show thatµx(yb) ≤ µx(y)−1 or, equivalently, thatµx(yb) < µx(y).
We will break this case into two sub-cases.
If both tρ, tx ∈ F , then µx(yb) = reachF ′(tx) < reachF (tx) ≤ µx(y). Here, the first inequality follows from Fact 5
and the second inequality follows from the fact that tx, tρ is y-disjoint and reach(tx) is at most reach(tρ) by
design.
Otherwise, at least one of tx, tρ arose from an extension. Since reachF ′(tx) ≤ reachF ′(tρ) by design, it follows that
reachF ′(tx) ≤ 0 as the reach of an extension is at most zero. If µx(y) > 0 then we are done: µx(yb) ≤ 0 <
µx(y). On the other hand, suppose µx(y) < 0. Recall the tine s mentioned before. As tx is y-disjoint with s
and µx(y) is negative by assumption, reachF (tx) is at most µx(y). We conclude that µx(yb) = reachF ′(tx) <
reachF (tx) ≤ µx(y) where the inequality follows from Fact 5.
7.2 A∗ simultaneously maximizes all relative margins
Proposition 2. Let w ∈ {h, H, A}∗ and b ∈ {h, H, A}. Assume that eorem 6 holds for characteristic strings of length
|w|. Let F ′ be the fork built by A∗ for the characteristic string wb. en
ρ(F ′) ≥


ρ(xy) + 1 if b = A ,
0 if b ∈ {h, H} and ρ(xy) = 0 ,
ρ(xy)− 1 otherwise .
(17)
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Furthermore, for any decomposition w = xy, |y| ≥ 0,
µx(F
′) ≥


µx(y) + 1 if b = A ,
0 if b ∈ {h, H} and ρ(xy) > µx(y) = 0 ,
0 if b = H and ρ(xy) = µx(y) = 0 ,
µx(y)− 1 otherwise.
(18)
Proof. Letw′ = wb. Let F and F ′ be the forks built byA∗ for the characteristic string w andwb, respectively, so that
F ⊑ F ′. By assumption, F is a canonical fork for w; this means ρ(F ) = ρ(w) and for all x ≺ w, µx(F ) = µx(y). It
will be helpful for the reader to recall Fact 5 before proceeding.
Proving (17). We wish to show that ρ(F ′) satisfies (17). If b = A then, by construction, F ′ = F . e symbol b = A
increases the reserve of every tine by one. us ρ(F ′) = ρ(F ) + 1 = ρ(xy) + 1. Now suppose b ∈ {h, H}. Since
all tines σ ∈ F ′ with label |xy| + 1 are conservative extensions, reachF ′(σ) = 0 and the F ′-reach of all F -tines
decreases by one. Let t be a maximum-reach tine in F ; since F is canonical, reachF (t) = ρ(F ) = ρ(xy). erefore,
ρ(F ′) ≥ reachF ′(t) = reachF (t) − 1 = ρ(xy) − 1. If ρ(F ) = 0 then this inequality can be tightened, as follows.
As all F -tines have negative F ′-reach, any maximum-reach F ′-tine must be one of the extensions; it follows that
ρ(F ′) = 0. us we have proved (17).
Proving (18). Letw = xy be an arbitrary decomposition; this x remains fixed for the remainder of the proof. (Note
that A∗ is unaware of this decomposition.)
Let τx, τρx ∈ F ′ be two yb-disjoint tines so that reachF ′(τρx) = ρ(F ′), reachF ′(τx) = µx(F ′), and, of all yb-
disjoint tine pairs in F ′ that aain this requirement, these two tines diverge the earliest. We say that the tines τx, τρx
witness µx(F
′).
Designate the witness tines tx, tρx ∈ F in the same way as we have designated τx, τρx ∈ F ′; specifically, w, y,
and F would substitute w′, yb, and F ′ in the recipe above. By assumption, F is a canonical fork for xy. erefore,
ρ(F ) = reachF (tρx) = ρ(xy), tx is y-disjoint with tρx, and µx(F ) = reachF (tx) = µx(y). We wish to show that
µx(F
′) satisfies (18).
If b = A then, by construction, F ′ = F and, therefore, tx and tρx are yb-disjoint in F ′. Note that the F ′-reach
of every F -tine is one plus its F -reach. erefore, µx(F
′) ≥ min(reachF ′(tρx), reachF ′(tx)) = reachF ′(tx) =
reachF (tx) + 1 = µx(y) + 1.
If b ∈ {h, H}, all tines in F ′ with label |w| + 1 arise from conservative extensions. Since the tines tx, tρx are
yb-disjoint in F ′, it follows that µx(F ′) ≥ min(reachF ′(tx), reachF ′(tρx)) ≥ reachF ′(tx) = reachF (tx) − 1 =
µx(y)− 1. Here, the first inequality follows from the definition of relative margin and the second one from the fact
that reach(tx) ≤ reach(tρx) by assumption. e first equality follows from Fact 5 and the second one follows from
our assumption that the tines tρx, tx ∈ F witness µx(F ) = µx(y).
However, we can tighten the above inequality when µx(y) is zero, as follows. Recall the sets Z, S,R, the zero-
reach tine z1, and the maximum-reach tine r1 from Figure 4. Also recall that z1, of all zero-reach tines, diverges
earliest from any maximum-reach tine. As reachF (z1) = µx(F ) = µx(y) = 0, it follows that z1 and r1 must be
y-disjoint. Let σ1 ∈ F ′ be the conservative extension of z1.
If ρ(xy) ≥ 1 and µx(y) = 0 thenσ1 is the only new extension inF ′ and it has reach zero inF ′. Note that reachF ′(r1) =
reachF (r1) − 1 = ρ(F ) − 1 ≥ 0 since ρ(F ) = ρ(xy) ≥ 1 by assumption. It follows that µx(F ′) ≥
min(reachF ′(σ1), reachF ′(r1)) ≥ reachF ′(σ1) = 0.
If ρ(xy) = 0 and µx(y) = 0 then Z = R and |Z| ≥ 2. If b = h, σ1 is the only tine in F ′ with the maximum reach,
zero. Note that reachF ′(r1) = reachF (r1)− 1 = ρ(F ) − 1 ≥ −1. Since σ1 and r1 are yb-disjoint, it follows
that µx(F
′) ≥ min(reachF ′(σ1), reachF ′(r1)) ≥ reachF ′(r1) ≥= −1.
On the other hand, if b = H then F ′ contains two new conservative extensions, σ1 and σ2, both with label
|xy| + 1, where z1 ≺ σ1 and r1 ≺ σ2. ese extensions, therefore, are yb-disjoint and have zero reach. It
follows that µx(F
′) ≥ 0.
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Note that if we want (18) to hold only for a given prefix x  w (a scenario pertinent in [4]), the adversary A∗
(which produces a canonical fork) would be an overkill. Instead, we can use a simpler, prefix-aware adversary such as
the one mentioned at the outset of Section 6.5; let us call this strategyA. In addition, instead of assumingeorem 6,
it suffices to assume Proposition 2 inductively for all strings of length |w|. Let F be the fork built byA for the string
w = xy. In conjunction with Proposition 1, this would imply “ρ(F ) = ρ(w) and µx(F ) = µx(y),” a critical property
used inside the above proof. We omit further details.
7.3 Proof of eorem 5 andeorem 6
Proof of eorem 5. Let w ∈ {h, H, A}∗. If w = ε then, by Claim 3, ρ(ε) = 0. If |w| ≥ 1, (13) is implied by the
combination of Claim 3, (15) and (17).
Let w = xy be an arbitrary decomposition. We proceed by induction on |y|. If |y| = 0 then Claim 3 implies that
µx(ε) = ρ(x). Otherwise, (14) is implied by the combination of Claim 3, (16) and (18).
Proof ofeorem 6. e proof is by induction on |w|. If w is the empty string ε, the only fork F ⊢ ε is the trivial
fork containing a single (honest) root vertex. By Claim 3, F satisfies ρ(ε) = 0 and µε(ε) = ρ(ε) = 0.
Now, let n be a non-negative integer and let w be a characteristic string of length n+1. Assume that eorem 6
holds for all characteristic strings of length 0, 1, . . . , n. Note that this assumption satisfies the premise in Proposi-
tion 2. A combined application of Claim 3, Proposition 1, and Proposition 2 implies eorem 6 for |w| = n + 1.
8 e semi-synchronous setting
We set the stage by stating the ∆-synchronous model.
Definition 20 (Semi-synchronous characteristic string). Let sl1, . . . , sln be a sequence of slots. A semi-synchronous
characteristic string w is an element of {h, H, A,⊥}n defined for a particular execution of a blockchain protocol on these
slots so that for t ∈ [n], wt =⊥ if slt was assigned to no participants; otherwise, wt = A if slt was assigned to an
adversarial participant; otherwise, wt = h if slt was assigned to a single honest participant; otherwise wt = H.
In the ∆-synchronous seing, axiom A4 is replaced by
A4∆. In a ∆-synchronous execution, if two honestly generated blocks B1 and B2 are labeled with slots sl1 and sl2
for which sl1 +∆ < sl2, the length of the unique blockchain terminating at B1 is strictly less than the length
of the unique blockchain terminating at B2.
Definition 21 (∆-Fork). Let w ∈ {h, H, A,⊥}n,∆ ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, P = {i : wi = h}, and Q = {j : wj = H}. A
∆-fork for the semi-synchronous string w consists of a directed and rooted tree F = (V,E) with a labeling ℓ : V →
{0, 1, . . . , n}. We insist that each edge of F is directed away from the root vertex. We require conditions (F1)–(F3) from
Definition 2 and
(F4∆) for any indices i, j ∈ P ∪Q, if i+∆ < j then the depth of a vertex with label i is strictly less than the depth of
a vertex with label j.
If F is a ∆-fork for the semi-synchronous characteristic string w, we write F ⊢∆ w. A ∆-fork generalizes a
synchronous fork inDefinition 2 since the laer is a∆-forkwith∆ = 0. We sometimes emphasize this fact bywriting
F ′ ⊢0 w′ wherew′ is a synchronous characteristic string andF ′ is a synchronous fork. Note that condition (F4∆) is a
direct analogue of axiom A4∆. (We already know that conditions (F1)–(F3) are direct analogues of axioms A1– A3.)
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Definition 22 (Reduction map). For ∆ ∈ N, we define the function ρ∆ : {⊥, h, H, A}∗ → {h, H, A}∗ inductively as
follows: ρ∆(ε) = ε and for w ∈ {⊥, h, H, A}∗,
ρ∆(bw) =


ρ∆(w) if b =⊥ ,
bρ∆(w) if b ∈ {h, H} and {⊥, A}∆  w ,
Aρ∆(w) otherwise .
(19)
Note that in the above definition, if w′ = ρ∆(w) and A = {i : wi 6=⊥} then |A| = |w′|. Also note that the reduction
ρ∆ implicitly defines, for each w, a bijective, increasing function π : A → [|w′|]. Note that ρ∆ turns an h or H
symbol in w into an A symbol in w′ with a constant probability. erefore, for any slot t in w, the reduction map ρ∆
amplifies the probability that the slot π(t) in w′ = ρ∆(w) is adversarial.
Definition 23 (∆-selement with parameters s, k ∈ N). Let n ∈ N and let w ∈ {⊥, h, H, A}n. Let t ∈ [s + k, n] be
an integer, wˆ  w, |wˆ| = t, and let F be any∆-fork for wˆ. We say that a slot s is not (k,∆)-seled in F if F contains
two maximum-length tines C1, C2 so that at least one of these tines contains a vertex with label s, both tines contain at
least k vertices aer slot s, and the label of their last common vertex is at most s − 1. Otherwise, we say that slot s is
(k,∆)-seled in F . We say that slot s is (k,∆)-seled in w if, for each t ≥ s+ k, it is (k,∆)-seled in every ∆-fork
F ⊢ wˆ where wˆ  w, |wˆ| = t.
Note that in the above definition, we truncated k trailing blocks from a tine whereas in Definition 3, we truncated
from a tine all trailing blocks corresponding to the last k slots. Note that this change of perspective is necessary since
w may contain ⊥ symbols, i.e., empty slots.
eorem 7 (Main theorem;∆-synchronous seing). Let f, ǫ ∈ (0, 1) and ∆ ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Let s, k, T ∈ N so that
T ≥ s+ k +∆. Write p⊥ = 1− f and β = (1− f)∆. Let pA ∈ [0, f) so that pA, f, ǫ, and β satisfy
pAβ/f + (1− β) ≤ (1− ǫ)/2 . (20)
Let ph ∈ (0, f − pA] and write pH = f − pA − ph. Let w ∈ {⊥, h, H, A}T be a random variable so that each wi, i ∈ [T ],
is independent and identically distributed as follows: Pr[wi = σ] = pσ for σ ∈ {h, H, A,⊥}. Let B be the distribution
of w. en
Pr
w
[slot s is not (k,∆)-seled in w] ≤ exp
(
−k · Ω(min(ǫ3, ǫ2phβ/f)) + ǫ(1 + ∆)
1− ǫ
)
.
(Here, the asymptotic notation hides constants that do not depend on ǫ or k.)
e main observation for proving the theorem above is that a ∆-selement violation in w, implies a certain
combinatorial event (parameterized by ∆) in a prefix of ρ∆(w). Specifically, we can analyze the laer event using
techniques developed in proving eorem 1.
A comment on consistent chain selection. Assuming axiom A0′ is satisfied, it is easy to prove an analogue of
eorem 2 in the ∆-synchronous seing; we need only use Bound 2 in lieu of Bound 1. e resulting bound on the
probability of a (k,∆)-selement violation would be
exp
(
−k · Ω(ǫ3) + ǫ(1 + ∆)
1− ǫ
)
.
We omit further details.
Road-map for the proof. Let w ∈ {⊥, h, H, A}∗, w′ = ρ∆(w), n = |w|, and m = |ρ∆|. Our roadmap forward is
as follows:
1. Show that there is a bijection between ∆-forks for w and synchronous forks for w′. In particular, for each∆-
fork F ⊢∆ w there is an isomorphic synchronous fork F ′ ⊢0 w′ and a bijective map {i ∈ [n] : wi 6=⊥} → [m].
is is shown in Proposition 3.
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2. Show that if w violates ∆-selement then some prefix b ≺ ρ∆(w) violates a suitably-defined combinatorial
event B∆. It is important that we can analyze this event using the techniques and results we have already
established. is is done in Lemma 2.
3. Since the decisions made by ρ∆ at each slot depends on the ∆ future slots, the distribution of the last few
symbols of ρ∆(w) will be “distorted” no maer how w is distributed. Assuming w has i.i.d. symbols, we need
to show that the symbols in the aforementioned prefix b ≺ ρ∆(w) are i.i.d. as well. is is done in Lemma 4.
4. Obtain a bound on Pr[B∆] in Bound 3 and proceed to prove eorem 7.
8.1 Structural properties of the reduction map
An important property of the reduction w′ = ρ∆(w) is that it readily provides a bijection between ∆-forks for w
and synchronous forks for w′.
Proposition 3. Let w ∈ {⊥, h, H, A}∗ and w′ = ρ∆(w). en, for every ∆-fork F ⊢ w there is a synchronous fork
F ′ ⊢0 w′ which is isomorphic to F . F ′ is called the image of F under ρ∆.
Proof sketch. Let F ′ be a copy of F . Establish the natural bijectionm : V (F )→ V (F ′) given by the copying proess,
i.e., u 7→ m(u), and relabel the vertices as
ℓ(m(u)) = π(ℓ(u)) for each vertex u ∈ F . (21)
Set r(F ′) = m(r(F )) and ℓ(r(F ′)) = 0. It suffices to check that F ′ ⊢0 w′, i.e., F ′ is a valid (synchronous) fork for
w′. Specifically, if there are two honest slots h1, h2 in w within a distance ∆ of each other, then the former honest
slot is mapped to an adversarial slot in w′. erefore, in F ′, an honest vertex is aware of all honest vertices with
smaller labels.
Next, we show that a ∆-selement violation in w implies a combinatorial event in ρ∆(w)
⌊∆ ∈ {h, H, A}∗. It
follows that we can use our existing stochastic techniques to bound ∆-selement violations on w.
Letw′ ∈ {h, H, A}∗ be a characteristic string. Define bi ∈ {±1} as bi = 1 iff w′i = A. Let S = (Si)|w
′|
i=0 be a simple
biased walk on Z defined as S0 = 0, Si = Si−1 + bi.
Lemma 2. Let w ∈ {⊥, h, H, A}∗,∆, s, k ∈ N so that |x| = s and xs 6=⊥. Let w′ = ρ∆(w) and write w′ = x′y′z′a′
so that |a′| = ∆ and |y′| ≥ 2k. Recall the simple biased walk S = (Si) on w′ defined above. Let E denote the event
that a slot c′ in y′ is Catalan in x′y′z′ and Sc′+k+i ≤ Sc′ −∆ for all i ≥ 0. If E occurs then s is (|y′|,∆)-seled in w.
Proof. Let π be the bijection described aer Definition 22. Note that |x′| = π(s). Assume that E occurs. us y′
contains a uniquely honest slot c′ which is Catalan in x′y′z′. Note that S|w′| ≤ S|x′y′z′|+∆ ≤ (Sc−∆)+∆ ≤ Sc′
where the second inequality follows from the assumption that E occurs. It follows that c′ is Catalan in w′ as well.
erefore, by eorem 3, c′ has the UVP in w′. Let c be the integer satisfying c′ = π(c).
Let b  xyz, |b| ≥ |xy| and b′ = ρ∆(b)  x′y′z′. (Necessarily, |b′| ≥ |x′y′|.) Since the reduction map gives
an isomorphism between every ∆-fork for b and its unique image (which is a synchronous fork for b′) under the
reduction ρ∆, it follows that c has the UVP in w.
For any ∆-fork F ⊢∆ b, let u ∈ F, ℓ(u) = c be the unique vertex contained by every tine t ∈ F viable at the
onset of any slot aer c. Consider all tines τ ∈ F so that τ has at least |y′| vertices with label at least s + 1. and
τ is viable at the onset of slot ℓ(τ) + 1. Since ℓ(τ) ≥ |xy| ≥ c, it follows that u  τ . us all these tines τ agree
about slot s since s < c = ℓ(u). In particular, if F contains two maximum-length tines τ1, τ2, each with at least |y′|
vertices aer slot s, then they would agree about slot s. In fact, ℓ(τ1 ∩ τ2) ≥ c > s. Hence smust be (|y′|,∆)-seled
in F and, since F was arbitrary, s must be (|y′|,∆)-seled in w.
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8.2 Stochastic properties of the reduction map
It turns out that if the bits inw are i.i.d. then so are the bits in a suitable prefix of ρ∆(w) albeit with a slightly different
distribution (which accounts for the absence of the empty slots). Specifically, for any string x = x1x2 . . . on any
alphabet and any k ∈ N, define x⌊k , x1 . . . x|x|−k.
Proposition 4. Let T ∈ N, w = w1 . . . wT ∈ {⊥, h, H, A}T be a sequence of i.i.d. symbols, and define pσ , Pr[w1 =
σ] for each σ ∈ {⊥, h, H, A}. Let x = ρ∆(w) and let ℓ = |x|. Write f = 1− p⊥ and α = (1− f)∆. en the symbols
in the string x⌊∆ are i.i.d. with
Pr[xi = h] = ph · α/f ,
Pr[xi = H] = pH · α/f , and
Pr[xi = A] = 1− α+ pA · α/f
(22)
for each i ∈ [ℓ −∆].
Proof. First let us pretend for a moment that T =∞; then ℓ =∞ as well. Let us write the infinite sequence w as a
concatenation of segments of⊥s punctuated by a single non-⊥ symbol. at is, write w = b0e1b1e2b2 . . .where, for
i = 0, 1, . . ., bi =⊥∗ and ei ∈ {h, H, A}. e reduction map ρ∆ translates a segment eibi into a symbol zi as follows:
zi =
{
A if ei = A or |bi| ≤ ∆− 1
ei if ei ∈ {h, H} and |bi| ≥ ∆ .
In particular, the segments eibi as well as the events that determine the value of an zi are disjoint. erefore, the
symbols in the infinite sequence z1z2 . . . = ρ∆(w1ww . . .) are independent and identically distributed.
If T is finite, however, the last ∆ symbols of x = ρ∆(w) are “distorted” in that the translated symbols in this
region will be more favored to be As. However, since the last ∆ symbols of x must correspond to at least ∆ trailing
symbols of w, it follows that x1 . . . xℓ−∆ is a prefix of z1z2 . . . .
It remains to compute the probabilities. Let qσ = Pr[zi = σ] for any i and σ ∈ {h, H, A}. en qh = ph/(1 −
p⊥)p∆⊥ = phα/f, qH = pHα/f , and qA = 1− (qh+ qH) = 1− (ph+pH)α/f = 1− (f −pA)α/f = 1−α+pAα/f .
e final ingredient to proving eorem 7 is a tail bound for (the complement of) the event E in Lemma 2.
Bound 3. Let T, s, k ∈ N, T ≥ s+2k+∆ and ǫ, qh ∈ (0, 1) so that the characteristic string w′ ∈ {h, H, A}T satisfies
the (ǫ, qh)-Bernoulli condition. Write w
′ = x′y′z′ so that y′ = ws . . . ws+2k−1. Let G denote the event that w′ has
a Catalan slot c which belongs to y′1 . . . y
′
k . Condition on G. Let ∆ ∈ N and recall the simple biased random walk
S = (Si) on w
′ defined above Lemma 2. Let B∆ be the event that Sc+k+i ≥ Sc −∆ for some i ≥ 0. en for large k,
Pr
w
[B∆ | G] ≤ exp
(
−k · Ω(ǫ2) + ǫ(1 + ∆)
1− ǫ
)
. (23)
Proof. For simplicity, write p = qA, and q = qh + qH. Conditioned on G, Sc ≥ Sc+i for all i ≥ 1. Let y =
y′[c+ 1 : c+ k] so that |y| = k. Moreover, #A(y) ≤ #h(y) + #H(y). Let fi(k), i = 0, 1, . . . be the probability that
Sc+k = Sc − i. us we wish to upper-bound f(∆, k) ,
∑∆
i=0 fj(k).
Write a = EA(y) and h = k − a and suppose h− a = j for some j = 0, 1, 2, . . . . Hence, for a fixed j, we have
h = (k + j)/2 and a = (k − j)/2. In addition, k and j has the same parity. us,
fj(k) =
(
k
(k + j)/2
)
p(k−j)/2q(k+j)/2 =
(
k
(k + j)/2
)
(pq)k/2(q/p)j/2 ≤
(
k
k/2
)
(pq)k/2(q/p)j/2
= O(1) · 2
k
√
πk
· (1− ǫ2)k2−k · (q/p)j/2 = O(1) · (1 − ǫ
2)k/2√
k
· (q/p)j/2
since p = (1− ǫ)/2 and q = (1 + ǫ)/2. It follows that
f(∆, k) =
∆∑
j=0
fj(k) ≤ O(1)√
k
· (1− ǫ2)k/2
∆∑
j=0
(q/p)j/2 ≤ O(1)√
k
· exp(−kǫ2/2) · (1 + ∆)(q/p)∆/2 .
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Since
(q/p)1/2 =
(
1 + ǫ
1− ǫ
)1/2
=
(
1 +
2ǫ
1− ǫ
)1/2
≤ exp(ǫ/(1− ǫ)) ,
we have
f(∆, k) ≤ O(1 + ∆)√
k
· exp(−kǫ2/2 + (1 + ∆)ǫ/(1− ǫ)) .
Note that for fixed ǫ and ∆, f(∆, k) decreases geometrically in k. us Pr[B∆ | Gc] =
∑
t≥k f(∆, t) is no more
than the quantity in (23).
8.3 Proof of eorem 7
e symbols in w are independent and identically distributed. Write w′ = ρ∆(w), w′ = x′y′z′a′, |a′| = ∆ and
|y′| ≥ 1 + ∆. Let k be an integer so that |y′| = 2k. Recall the random walk S = (Si) on w′ defined above
Lemma 2. Let G1 denote the (good) event that a slot c
′ in y′ is Catalan in x′y′z′. Let G2 denote the (good) event
that Sc′+k+i ≤ Sc′ − ∆ for all i ≥ 0. By Lemma 2, G1 ∩ G2 implies A. (Here, · denotes the complement.) e
contrapositive of the above statement gives us
Pr[A] ≤ Pr[G1] + Pr[G2 | G1] . (24)
e terms on the right-hand side can be bounded from above using Bounds 1 and 3, respectively, provided the
symbols in x′y′z′ are i.i.d. with Pr[x′1 = A] = (1 − ǫ)/2. Let us check whether this condition holds. We have
f = 1 − p⊥ and α = (1 − f)∆. Proposition 4 states that the symbols of x′y′z′ are i.i.d. with distribution given
by (22). For each σ ∈ {h, H, A} we write p′σ = Pr[x′1 = σ].
e condition (20) can be equivalently stated as 1−(1−pA/f)α = (1−ǫ)/2. We check that p′A = 1−(p′h+p′H) =
1− (ph + pH)α/f = 1− (f − pA)α/f = 1− (1 − pA/f)α = (1− ǫ)/2 and, consequently, p′h + p′H = (1 + ǫ)/2.
Hence we can directly apply Bound 3 on the terms in the right-hand side of (24) to conclude that
Pr[A] ≤ exp
(
−k (Ω(min(ǫ3, ǫ2qh)))+ ǫ(1 + ∆)
1− ǫ
)
.
e claim involving the distributionW follows from the analogous claim in eorem 1.
9 e common prefix property
For the sake of simplicity, assume the synchronous communication model from Section 2.2; the ∆-synchronous
seing can be handled in the same way as delineated in Sections 8 and 8.
e common prefix property with parameter k asserts that, for any slot index s, if an honest observer at slot
s+k adopts a blockchain C, the prefix C[0 : s]will be present in every honestly-held blockchain at or aer slot s+k.
(Here, C[0 : s] denotes the prefix of the blockchain C containing only the blocks issued from slots 0, 1, . . . , s.)
We translate this property into the framework of forks. Consider a tine t of a fork F ⊢ w. e trimmed tine t⌊k is
defined as the portion of t labeled with slots {0, . . . , ℓ(t)− k}. For two tines, we use the notation t1  t2 to indicate
that the tine t1 is a prefix of tine t2.
Definition 24 (Common Prefix Property with parameter k ∈ N). Let w be a characteristic string. A fork F ⊢ w
satisfies k-CPslot if, for all pairs (t1, t2) of viable tines F for which ℓ(t1) ≤ ℓ(t2), we have t⌊k1  t2. Otherwise, we say
that the tine-pair (t1, t2) is a witness to a k-CP
slot violation. Finally, w satisfies k-CPslot if every fork F ⊢ w satisfies
k-CPslot.
If a stringw does not possess the k-CPslot property, we say thatw violates k-CPslot. Observe that traditionally (cf.
[6]), the truncated chain is defined in terms of deleting a suffix of (block-)length k from C. We denote this traditional
version of the common prefix property as the k-CP property. Note, however, that a k-CP violation immediately
implies a k-CPslot violation; hence, bounding the probability of a k-CPslot violation is sufficient to rule out both
events.
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Connection with the UVP. Note that if w admits a k-CPslot violation, then there must be a fork F containing
two distinct viable tines t1, t2, ℓ(t1) ≤ ℓ(t2) so that ℓ(t1) − ℓ(t1 ∩ t2) ≥ k + 1. en t1 must contain a vertex
v, ℓ(t1 ∩ t2) < ℓ(v) ≤ ℓ(t1)− k so that v does not belong to t2. If every substring x of w with |x| ≥ k, contained a
slot with the UVP then we would never have a k-CPslot violation. erefore,
w violates
k-CPslot
=⇒
w has a substring y, |y| ≥ k so
that no slot indexed by y has
the UVP in w.
(25)
Recall that a uniquely honest Catalan slot has the UVP. is fact allows us to bound the probability of common
prefix violations by reasoning only about Catalan slots.5
eorem 8 (Main theorem; CP version). Let ǫ, ph ∈ (0, 1) and T, k ∈ N, T ≥ k. Let w be a length-T characteristic
string satisfying the (ǫ, ph)-Bernoulli condition. en
Pr
w
[w violates k-CP] ≤ Pr
w
[w violates k-CPslot] ≤ T · exp(−k · Ω(min(ǫ3, ǫ2ph))) .
Next, suppose that axiom A0′ is satisfied. If w is a length-T bivalent characteristic string satisfying the (ǫ, 0)-
Bernoulli condition then
Pr
w
[w violates k-CP] ≤ Pr
w
[w violates k-CPslot] ≤ T · exp(−k · Ω(ǫ3(1 +O(ǫ)))) .
Proof. (e first claim.) Let s ∈ [T − k]. Let εk be the probability that y = ws . . . ws+k−1 contains no slot with
the UVP in w. en, recalling (25), we can apply a union bound over all substrings of w of length at least k to get
Pr[w violates k-CPslot] ≤ T ∑r≥k εr where the factor T represents a summation over all s ∈ [T − k + 1]. By
eorem 3, if a substring y of w does not contain a slot with the unique vertex property in w, y cannot contain a
uniquely honest slot that is Catalan in w. erefore, εk is no more than the error probability from Bound 1. Since εk
decreases exponentially in k, we can write
Pr[w violates k-CPslot] ≤ T ·O(1) · εk .
is proves the second inequality. e first inequality follows since, in a given characteristic string, a k-CP violation
implies a k-CPslot violation.
(e second claim.) e proof in this case is identical to the preceding argument except that we need to refer to
eorem 4 in lieu of eorem 3 and Bound 2 in lieu of Bound 1.
e ∆-synchronous setting. A k-CP violation in a ∆-fork for a string w ∈ {⊥, h, H, A}∗ would imply a k-CP
violation in the corresponding synchronous fork in the string ρ∆(w) ∈ {h, H, A}∗ and, consequently, a k-CPslot
violation in ρ∆(w). We omit further details.
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A CP violations and balanced forks with concurrent honest leaders
Balanced forks played a critical role in the analysis of [3]. Specifically, a balanced fork was equivalent to a selement
violation in their seing and a CP violation would also imply a balanced fork. In the current analysis, we have
analyzed selement and CP violations through their connections with the UVP and Catalan slots; thus balanced
forks are not necessary in our analysis. However, it is instructive to see whether the statement “a CP violation
implies a balanced fork” still holds in our model and, importantly, how the existing proof needs to be modified.
us the the goal of this section is to proveeorem 9 belowwhichwould yield an alternative proof ofeorem 8
without using the Catalan slots. However, the simplicity of the proof of eorem 8 in Section 9 demonstrates the
expressive power of the UVP and Catalan slots compared to relative margin and balanced forks.
A k-CPslot violation implies a k-settlement violation. Let w be a characteristic string, wrien w = xy, and
let F be a fork for w. Recall that a slot s = |x| + 1 is not k-seled if and only if F contains two maximum-length
tines that diverge prior to s, i.e., F is x-balanced (see Definition 18).
Definition 25 (Slot divergence). Let w ∈ {h, H, A}∗ and let F be a fork for w. Define the slot divergence of two tines
t1, t2 ∈ F as
divslot(t1, t2) , ℓ(t1)− ℓ(t1 ∩ t2) where ℓ(t1) ≤ ℓ(t2) . (26)
We can generalize this notion for forks and characteristic strings as follows: divslot(F ) , maxt1,t2∈F divslot(t1, t2) and
divslot(w) , maxF⊢w divslot(F ).
By definition, a k-CPslot violation implies the existence of a fork with a slot divergence at least k+1. eorem 9
below shows that a if a fork has a slot divergence at least k+1 then there is a balanced fork for a prefix of the same
characteristic string so that two maximum-length tine diverge prior to last k slots. erefore, a k-CPslot violation
implies an (s, k)-selement violation for some slot s.
eorem 9. Let k, T ∈ N. Let w ∈ {h, H, A}T be a characteristic string so that divslot(w) ≥ k + 1. en there is a
decomposition w = xyz and a fork Fˆ ⊢ xy, where |y| ≥ k, so that Fˆ is x-balanced.
Recall that ℓ(t) is the slot index of the last vertex of tine t. Define A ,
⋃
F⊢w AF where, for a given fork F ⊢ w,
define
AF ,
{
(τ1, τ2) :
τ1, τ2 are two viable tines in the fork F ,
ℓ(τ1) ≤ ℓ(τ2), and divslot(τ1, τ2) ≥ k + 1
}
.
Notice that there must be a tine-pair (t1, t2) ∈ A which satisfies the following two conditions:
divslot(t1, t2) is maximal over A , (27)
|ℓ(t2)− ℓ(t1)| is minimal among all tine-pairs in A for which (27) holds , (28)
and
For a fixed t2, the tine t1 has the maximum length over all tines t
′
1, ℓ(t
′
1) = ℓ(t1)
such that (t′1, t2) satisfies (27) and (28) .
(29)
(Note that t1, t2 are not uniquely identified.) e tines t1, t2 will play a special role in our proof; let F be a fork
containing these tines.
Recall given a characteristic string w ∈ {h, H, A}∗, a uniquely honest slot contains the symbol h, a multiply
honest slot contains the symbol H, and an adversarial slot contains the symbol A. We call a slot honest if it contains
either an h or an H; otherwise, we call it an adversarial slot.
e prefix x, fork Fx, and vertex u. Let u denote the last vertex on the tine t1 ∩ t2, as shown in the diagram
below, and let α , ℓ(u) = ℓ(t1 ∩ t2). Let x , w1, . . . , wα and let Fx be the fork-prefix of F supported on x. We
will argue that α must be a uniquely honest slot and, in addition, that Fx must contain a unique longest tine tu
terminating at the vertex u. We will also identify a substring y, |y| ≥ k such thatw can be wrien as w = xyz. en
we will construct a balanced fork F˜y ⊢ y by modifying the subgraph of F supported on y. We will finish the proof
by constructing an x-balanced fork by suitably appending F˜y to Fx.
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ut1
t2
αmust be a uniquely honest slot. We observe, first of all, that the slot α can neither be adversarial nor multiply
honest: otherwise it is easy to construct a forkF ′ ⊢ w and a pair of tines inF ′ that violate (27). Specifically, construct
F ′ from F by adding a new vertex u′ to F for which ℓ(u′) = ℓ(u), adding an edge to u′ from the vertex preceding
u, and replacing the edge of t1 following u with one from u
′; then the other relevant properties of the fork are
maintained, but the slot divergence of the resulting tines has increased by at least one. (See the diagram below.)
u
u′
t1
t2
Fx has a unique, longest (and honest) tine tu. A similar argument implies that the fork Fx has a unique vertex
of depth depth(u): namely, u itself. In the presence of another vertex u′ (of Fx) with depth depth(u), “redirecting”
t1 through u
′ (as in the argument above) would likewise result in a fork with a larger slot divergence. To see this,
notice that ℓ(u′)must be strictly less than ℓ(u) since ℓ(u) is an honest slot (which means u is the only vertex at that
slot). us ℓ(·) would indeed be increasing along this new tine (resulting from redirecting t1). As α is the last index
of the string x, this additionally implies that Fx has no vertices of depth exceeding depth(u). Let tu ∈ Fx be the
tine with ℓ(tu) = α.
e honest tine tu is the unique longest tine in Fx . (30)
Identifying y. Let β denote the smallest honest index of w for which β ≥ ℓ(t2), with the convention that if there
is no such index we define β = T + 1. us β ≥ ℓ(t2) ≥ ℓ(t1). ese indices, α and β, distinguish the substrings
y = wα+1 . . . wβ−1 and z = wβ . . . wT ; we will focus on y in the remainder of the proof. Since the function ℓ(·) is
strictly increasing along any tine, observe that
|y| = (β − 1)− (α+ 1) + 1 = β − α− 1 ≥ (ℓ(t1)− ℓ(u))− 1 ≥ (k + 1)− 1 = k .
Hence y has the desired length and it suffices to establish that it is forkable.6
Honest indices in xy have small depths. e minimality assumption (28) implies that any honest index h for
which h < β has depth no more than min(length(t1), length(t2)): specifically, we claim that
h < β =⇒ d(h) ≤ min(length(t1), length(t2)) . (31)
To see this, consider an honest index h, h < β and a tine th for which ℓ(th) = h. If ℓ(t2) is honest then h < β = ℓ(t2).
Otherwise, h < ℓ(t2) < β since ℓ(t2) is adversarial. In any case, h < ℓ(t2) and, since t2 is viable, it follows
immediately that d(h) ≤ length(t2). Similarly, if h < ℓ(t1) then d(h) ≤ length(t1) since t1 is viable as well.
Now consider the case h = ℓ(t1). We claim that
If h = ℓ(t1) < β then d(h) = length(t1) . (32)
We can rule out the case h = ℓ(t1) = ℓ(t2) since if this happens, ℓ(t2) is honest and β = ℓ(t2), contradicting our
assumption that h < β. us, it must be the case that h = ℓ(t1) < ℓ(t2). In this case, the claim follows trivially if
6 In Blum et al. [3], |y| was at least k + 1. e difference is due to the fact that in their analysis, a slot with multiple vertices was necessarily
adversarial.
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ℓ(t1) is a uniquely honest slot. Otherwise, let t be a tine with the maximum length among all tines labeled with the
multiply honest slot h = ℓ(t1) < ℓ(t2). We wish to show that length(t1) = length(t). ere are four contingencies
to consider; the first three of these lead to contradictions and for the last one, we get length(t1) = d(h) = length(t).
• If (t, t2) 6∈ A, divslot(t, t2) is at most k. Since divslot(t1, t2) is at least k+1, t must share a vertex with t2 aer
slot ℓ(u). But this means ℓ(t ∩ t1) = ℓ(u) and divslot(t, t1) = divslot(t1, t2) ≥ k + 1. As a result, (t, t1) ∈ A.
However, this violates (28) since |ℓ(t)− ℓ(t1)| = 0 < |ℓ(t2)− ℓ(t1)| by assumption.
• If (t, t2) is in A and ℓ(t ∩ t1) < ℓ(u), then divslot(t, t1) > divslot(t1, t2), violating (27).
• If (t, t2) is in A and ℓ(t ∩ t1) = ℓ(u), this means t is disjoint with t1 aer ℓ(u). en (28) is violated since
divslot(t, t1) = divslot(t1, t2) but |ℓ(t)− ℓ(t1)| = 0 < |ℓ(t2)− ℓ(t1)| by assumption.
• If (t, t2) is in A and ℓ(t ∩ t1) > ℓ(u), this means t shares a vertex with t1 aer ℓ(u). en divslot(t, t2) =
divslot(t1, t2) and |ℓ(t2)−ℓ(t1)| = |ℓ(t2)−ℓ(t)|. By (29), length(t1) ≥ length(t); hence length(t1) = length(t)
since by assumption, t has the maximum length among all tines with label ℓ(t1). Hence length(t1) = d(h).
e remaining case for proving (31), i.e., when ℓ(t1) < h < ℓ(t2), can be ruled out by the argument below.
ere is no honest index between ℓ(t1) and ℓ(t2). We claim that
ere is no honest index h satisfying ℓ(t1) < h < ℓ(t2) . (33)
e claim above is trivially true if ℓ(t1) = ℓ(t2). Otherwise, suppose (toward a contradiction) that h is an honest
index satisfying ℓ(t1) < h < ℓ(t2). Let th be an honest tine at slot h. e tine-pair (t1, th) may or may not be in A.
We will show that both cases lead to contradictions.
• If (t1, th) is inA and ℓ(t1∩th) ≤ ℓ(u), divslot(t1, th) is at least divslot(t1, t2). In fact, due to (27), this inequality
must be an equality. However, the assumption ℓ(t1) < h < ℓ(t2) contradicts (28).
• If (t1, th) is in A and ℓ(t1 ∩ th) > ℓ(u), it follows that divslot(th, t2) > divslot(t1, t2). As the laer quantity is
at least k + 1, (th, t2) must be in A. e preceding inequality, however, contradicts (27).
• If (t1, th) 6∈ A, divslot(t1, th) is at most k. As divslot(t1, t2) is at least k + 1, th and t1 must share a vertex
aer slot ℓ(u). Since ℓ(t1) < h < ℓ(t2) by assumption, divslot(th, t2) > divslot(t1, t2) ≥ k+1 and, as a result,
(th, t2) ∈ A. However, the strict inequality above violates (27).
We conclude that (33)—and thus (31)—is true. (Note that in the above argument, all we needed was that th is a viable
tine since in all cases, th appears in a tine-pair in A. us (33) can be generalized as saying “there is no fork for w
with a viable tine t so that ℓ(t1) < ℓ(t) < ℓ(t2).”)
A fork F⊲u⊳ where all long tines go through u. In light of the remarks above, we observe that the fork F
may be “pinched” at u to yield an essentially identical fork F⊲u⊳ ⊢ w with the exception that all tines of length
exceeding depth(u) pass through the vertex u. Specifically, the fork F⊲u⊳ ⊢ w is defined to be the graph obtained
from F by changing every edge of F directed towards a vertex of depth depth(u) + 1 so that it originates from u.
To see that the resulting tree is a well-defined fork, it suffices to check that ℓ(·) is still increasing along all tines of
F⊲u⊳. For this purpose, consider the effect of this pinching on an individual tine t terminating at a particular vertex
v—it is replaced with a tine t⊲u⊳ defined so that:
• If length(t) ≤ depth(u), the tine t is unchanged: t⊲u⊳ = t.
• Otherwise, length(t) > depth(u) and t has a vertex v of depth depth(u) + 1; note that ℓ(v) > ℓ(u) because
Fx contains no vertices of depth exceeding depth(u). en t
⊲u⊳ is defined to be the path given by the tine
terminating at u, a (new) edge from u to v, and the suffix of t beginning at z. (As ℓ(v) > ℓ(u) this has the
increasing label property.)
us the tree F⊲u⊳ is a legal fork on the same vertex set; note that the depths of vertices in F and F⊲u⊳ are
identical.
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Constructing a fork Fy ⊢ y containing two long tines. By excising the tree rooted at u from this pinched fork
F⊲u⊳, we may extract a fork for the string wα+1 . . . wT . Specifically, consider the induced subgraph F
u⊳ of F⊲u⊳
given by the vertices {u} ∪ {v : depth(v) > depth(u)}. By treating u as a root vertex and suitably defining the
labels ℓu⊳ of Fu⊳ so that ℓu⊳(v) = ℓ(v)− ℓ(u), this subgraph has the defining properties of a fork for wα+1 . . . wT .
In particular, considering that α is honest, it follows that each honest index h > α has depth d(h) > length(u) and
hence any vertex with label h is also present in Fu⊳. For a tine t of F⊲u⊳, we let tu⊳ denote the suffix of this tine
beginning at u, which forms a tine in Fu⊳. (If length(t) ≤ depth(u), we define tu⊳ to consist solely of the vertex
u.) Considering t1
u⊳ and t2
u⊳, let tˇi, i ∈ {1, 2} be the longest prefix of tiu⊳ so that tˇi is labeled by a slot in y. Since
the tines t1
u⊳, t2
u⊳ are disjoint in Fu⊳, so are tˇ1, tˇ2.
Recall that that y is as a prefix of wα+1 . . . wT . Let h
∗ be the largest honest index in y. Let Fy denote the subtree
of Fu⊳, with the same root as Fu⊳, containing the following tines: tˇ1, tˇ2, and all tines t
u⊳ ∈ Fu⊳ \ {tˇ1, tˇ2} so that
ℓ(tu⊳) is drawn from y and
length(tu⊳) ≤ d(h∗) . (34)
Note that the length of every honest tine labeled by y is at most d(h∗); hence, thanks to (31), Fy contains all honest
tines from Fu⊳ that have labels in y. Note, in addition, that the tines tˇ1 and tˇ2 are consistently labeled in Fy . us
Fy satisfies all properties of a legal fork.
Having defined Fy , we claim that
min
(
length(tˇ1), length(tˇ2)
) ≥ d(h∗) . (35)
Let i ∈ {1, 2}. If ℓ(ti) < β then tˇi = tiu⊳ and, by (31), length(tˇi) = length(tiu⊳) ≥ d(h∗). Othereise, we have
ℓ(ti) = β which means ℓ(ti) is an honest slot. us ti
u⊳ must be an honest tine, building directly on top of the
viable tine tˇi. erefore, we have length(tˇi) ≥ d(h∗).
Constructing a balanced fork F˜y ⊢ y. If length(tˇ1) = length(tˇ2), set F˜y = Fy and, due to (34) and (35), the
fork F˜y ⊢ y must be balanced. Otherwise, let a, b ∈ {1, 2}, a 6= b be two integers so that length(tˇa) > length(tˇb).
We modify Fy by deleting some trailing nodes from tˇa so that the surviving prefix—let it be denoted by t˜a—has the
same length as tˇb. at is, we achieve
length(t˜a) = length(tˇb) = min
(
length(tˇ1), length(tˇ2)
)
.
Let F˜y be the resulting fork. Equations (34) and (35) imply that F˜y has at least two maximum-length tines (i.e., t˜a and
tˇb) and therefore, it is balanced. It remains to show that the longer tine, tˇa, has sufficiently many trailing adversarial
vertices so that aer deleting them, we obtain length(t˜a) = length(tˇb). (If we had to delete an honest vertex in this
process, F˜y may have violated property (F3) in the definition of a fork.) Let ha be the label of the last honest vertex
on tˇa. anks to (35), we have length(tˇa) > length(tˇb) ≥ d(h∗) ≥ d(ha). Hence all vertices in tˇa with labels in
[ha + 1, ℓ(tˇa)] must be adversarial; we can safely delete | length(tˇa)− length(tˇb)| of these adversarial vertices.
An x-balanced fork Fˆ ⊑ F . Let us identify the root of the fork F˜y with the vertex u of Fx and let Fˆ be the
resulting graph (aer “gluing” the root of F˜y to u). By (30), it is easy to see that the fork Fˆ ⊑ F is indeed a valid
fork on the string xy. Moreover, Fˆ is x-balanced since F˜y is balanced. e claim in eorem 9 follows immediately
since |y| ≥ k.
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